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ABSTRACT

Canter, Julius Britton. M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 2012.
The Great Recession of 2007-2009: Examining the Presence of a Credit Crunch.

This study of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and the credit crunch
phenomenon suggests that there is an ongoing rationing effect on bank loans following
the financial crisis of 2008. The rationing effect may lead to lower interest rates as banks
switch to safer lending in order to hedge risk. However, the credit crunch may be
inequitable as it primarily affects bank dependent borrowers, as well as restricting
lending to new customers. An in-depth review of the current literature, empirical studies,
leading economic indicators, and bank surveys are examined to reach this conclusion. We
find that there are real economic effects due to the monetary transmission mechanism of
credit. The risk-based capital standard (RBC) associated with the Basel Accords is a
contributing factor of the credit crunch phenomenon. The capital standard restricts bank
lending, most notably during periods of economic downturn, but also provides incentives
for banks to reconfigure their portfolios towards securitized assets. These incentives
created by the Basel Accords for banks to shift their portfolios towards securities may
have had an integral role in the growth of the subprime mortgage market leading to the
financial crisis of 2008. It is recommended that the risk-based capital standard should be

re-examined in order to free up credit markets and incentivize banks to shift away from
investing in government securities rather than private loans.
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I.

Introduction
“The Great Recession,” as it has been termed, was the worst recession which the

United States has experienced since the disastrous economic times of the Great
Depression of the 1930’s. Its adverse economic effects have been felt not only in the
United States, but due to expanding globalization, the rest of the world as well. In the
United States, the economy had entered into recession beginning in December 2007, and
finished receding in June 2009 (U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).
However, the common requisite used by economists of two quarters of growth did not
occur until the end of 2009.
A near consensus among economists believe that this economic downturn was
spurred from a financial crisis linked to careless lending practices by financial institutions
encouraged by government policy and the increasing popularity (due to increasing
returns) of the securitization of real estate mortgages in the United States. Many of these
securities and their associated risks were not accurately assessed at the time. Increasing
returns on mortgage-backed securities led to a more broad based credit expansion,
feeding a global speculative bubble for real estate and equities. Eventually the bubble
burst, sending many of the developed economies of the world into a deep recession.
While the U.S. economy has officially escaped from recession, its effects are still
felt throughout. Recovery has been slow and modest, failing to meet many of the
expectations set by the U.S. government and economists. While there are many
ideologies on how to spur economic recovery, there are equally as many ideas on why the
current economic progress has been so stagnant. Two phenomena, the “credit crunch”
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and the “liquidity trap,” are both capable of slowing economic recovery, even causing
economic recession.
Herein lies the focus of this paper: To establish whether the U.S. economy has
entered into a credit crunch prior, during, or after the Great Recession o f2007-2009.
Theoretically, a credit crunch and a liquidity trap appear to be opposing phenomena. A
credit crunch should be defined as a restriction in the supply of financial credit,
potentially from government regulation or other restrictions which prohibit banks from
lending as they would normally deem desirable. A liquidity trap however, should be
considered a demand side phenomenon in which monetary policy fails to have an
economic effect, failing to affect credit demand. Furthermore, it is important to examine
the causality of credit crunch / liquidity trap phenomenon whether due to recession, or
vice-versa. In order to examine these two phenomena, it is important to take a deeper
look at the economic conditions which were essential in the credit expansion period
known as “The Great Moderation,” as well as its eventual collapse which may have led to
a credit crunch.
To assess whether the U.S. economy is currently experiencing a credit crunch or liquidity
trap, it is necessary to examine historical data as well as current economic data. A
literature review of past empirical research and theory will be necessary to build a better
understanding of contributing factors, as well as a comparison to the current crisis. We
also intend to examine contributing factors to a credit crunch, as well as researching
whether banks have been pressured to reduce lending involuntarily, which would be a
“red herring” to a regulatory-driven credit crunch. For both investigations into the
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contributing factors and presence of both phenomena, regression models should be
examined as well.
We expect to find the presence of at least a credit crunch during or after the Great
Recession, but we would like to determine how much the credit crunch has affected the
real economy. It is our opinion that the recession and slow economic recovery has been
much too deep and sluggish, in which a credit crunch should be suspect as a road block to
economic recovery. However, we expect to have minor difficulties at first in establishing
a proper methodology for separating the supply and demand factors to credit creation and
the transmission of real economic effects.

a. Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether the credit crunch phenomenon
was present at the start of, during, and/or after the Great Recession of 2007-2009. As
well, we aim to gain greater understanding of monetary transmission mechanisms. In
order for the credit crunch phenomenon to be relevant and real, a monetary transmission
mechanism needs to exist to allow for Federal Reserve policy innovations or other
regulations to have an effect on aggregate loan levels. We are a bit skeptical of the
presence of a liquidity trap, and would expect to find either no liquidity trap or at least a
modest amount of real economic influence from current monetary tools available to the
Federal Reserve. Finally, we would like to use this paper as a means for greater
understanding of finance, credit creation, and the impact of monetary policy on real
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economic variables in general.

b. Study Outline
This study begins in section III with a review of credit crunch theory, as well as
differentiating between the “credit view” and “money view.” Section IV continues with
an analysis of trends in gross domestic output growth, unemployment rate, interest rates,
and money supply growth over the period 2005 to present. Section V includes a survey of
the current literature on the interaction of financial markets and real economic activity.
Finally, section VI is our summary of findings and conclusions, as well as our
recommendations to remedy the current credit crunch phenomenon.

II.

Examining Data Trends
Prior to diving deeper into the question of whether the U.S. economy has entered

a credit crunch, prior to, during, and/or after the Great Recession of 2007-2009, it is
useful to take a look at the business cycle and corresponding key economic variables. We
examine the data trends of key economic variables: GDP percentage growth,
unemployment rate, primary loan interest rate, and M2 percentage growth. For the most
part, these economic indicators follow the expected trend associated with an economic
glut.
Real GDP, the standard for measuring a business cycle, obviously began to
consistently contract during the late part of 2007, reaching the bottom of the trough in the

later part of 2008, before turning upwards with sluggish growth thereafter. While the
trend of GDP is not necessarily informative beyond its obvious use as a measure of
business cycle and economic health, it allows us to use it alongside other economic
indicators to reach a clear picture of the economic condition during this period. It also
allows one to reach conclusions about the interactions between these variables, and
hopefully sheds light on their relation to the credit crunch phenomenon.

Figure I.

While the downturn in GDP percentage growth shows the adverse effect to the
economy via overall productivity, a more striking and relevant picture may be obtained
by way of viewing the trend of the unemployment rate during this period. What we see is
that the unemployment rate reaches an impressive low during 2000, below 4%, before

increasing to above 6% during the post 9/11 recession. The unemployment rate continued
to float around 5% after it had recovered from the post 9/11 recession, which is the
typical natural rate of unemployment. However, following the financial market crisis
which triggered the Great Recession, the unemployment rate consistently and sharply
rose upwards to around 10% unemployment, actually going above 10% soon after the
recession had officially ended. Post recession has shown a stubborn unemployment rate
that tends to float around 9-10%. Of all economic indicators, this may show the most
important effect of the recession as it immediately affects those living in the United
States.

Figure II.
Civilian Unemployment Rate (UNRATE)
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Another important indicator to examine is the Primary Loan Interest Rate, which
may be of interest when examining the credit crunch phenomenon as it would be assumed
that the interest rate of loans are highly correlated with the supply of bank loans. Herein
lies the first apparently useful indicator concerning credit crunch, potentially useful as
evidence against the credit crunch phenomenon. What we see is that during this
recessionary period, prime loan rates were consistently decreasing, bottoming out
towards 3%. One may try and make the argument that the presence of low interest rates
shows that loans were in abundance, and therefore the equilibrium interest rate has
decreased. However, this would be irresponsible, completely ignoring the demand side
factors which affect interest rates, as well as other interest rate factors, primarily money
supply and Federal Reserve monetary policy. What we do know is that during this period,
the Federal Reserve was actively involved in bond purchasing programs and the banking
“bail-out” program known as TARP, which was aiming to make the financial markets
more liquid and to prevent an even deeper recession. These are all factors which surely
would have had an influence on the prime loan rate. As well, one must keep in mind that
this may not paint a fully accurate picture of what was happening in the financial markets
during this period, as the prime lending rate has its own weaknesses. First and foremost,
the prime rate is used only for those preferred banking customers, essentially a safe
borrower. While the interest rates were low during this period, this does not mean that all
bank loan rates were equally relatively low. Furthermore, there may have been a process
of rationing, in which banks may lend at a lower rate only to preferred customers with the
least risk, ignoring other customers who were perceived to be an increased risk at the
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time. As well, if lending continued, it is possible that it was done so at either a higher rate
or at a sum below which the borrower may have requested.
Figure III.

Related to the primary loan interest rate is the M2 money supply. Examining the
trend of M2 money during the last 10 year period shows an interesting picture. We see
that during the post 9/11 recession, as well as during the Great Recession, the M2 growth
rate appears to drop sharply at the beginning of the recession, but soon after shows a
sharp increase in the growth rate. The sharp increase in the M2 money stock is most
noticeable when examining the M2 money stock during the Great Recession, reaching
above 2.5% growth during 2009, before experiencing a sudden drop and maintaining
sluggish growth. This would most likely show the effects of a prompt central bank
response including bond buying programs and a period of monetary easing to buffer the

downturn in the economy. However, once again the question needs to be answered
whether these policies had any effect on preventing a credit crunch, which most likely
was a main concern of policy makers during this period. Did M2 money stock increase,
while merely creating a period of lower interest rates for those fortunate repeat and new
customers who met increased credit standards? Or did the period of easy money prevent a
credit crunch, while lowering interest rates to stimulate the economy on a larger scale and
soften the burden of a massive financial collapse? It may also be the case that the low
interest rates during the period represented sufficient if not artificially high liquidity, but
also the effects of diminished liquidity demand due to decreased consumption and
investment demand.

Figure IV.
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III.

Credit Crunch Theory: Credit View vs. Money View

One of the important pieces of the credit crunch phenomenon and its supposed
effects relies upon theory of how money, credit, and interest rates affect the real
economy. Primarily there are often two major views within the macroeconomics
literature, the “credit view” and the ’’money view.” Both of these views are covered by
Bolton and Freixas (2006) in order to bring about greater understanding of the monetary
transmission mechanism that takes place through the financial sector, in particular the
banking sector and securities markets. They examine specifically the effects of openmarket operations on bank lending and securities issues on the real economy.
The “credit view” of monetary policy in its fundamental form relies on an
assumed exogenous limited substitutability between bank loans and bonds. The “money
view” or “liquidity view” as it is often referred to, on the contrary, takes the position that
bonds and loans are perfect substitutes and only allow for the effects of monetary policy
on aggregate investment, consumption, and savings through changes in interest rates
(Bolton and Freixnas, 2006, p.829). Deviations in interest rates according to the “money
view” are actively achieved via a “tightening”/“loosening” of monetary policy by the
Federal Reserve by way of bond sales/purchases and a reduction/increase of banking
reserves. The “credit view” however, allows for an additional effect on investment and
economic activity operating through bank credit supply controlled through changes in
bank reserve requirements. Bolton and Freixas (2006) point out that this theory relies on
two critical assumptions. The first assumption is that firms cannot easily substitute
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between bank loans and bonds. The second assumption is that banks cannot easily
substitute reversible liabilities such as deposits and non-reservable liabilities such as bank
bond issues (Bolton and Freixas, 2006, p. 830).
Importantly, Bolton and Freixas (2006) augment the “credit view,” pointing out
an additional channel operating through bank equity capital. This new channel works
through the equilibrium composition of funding between direct and intermediate finance,
as well as banks’ incentives to raise equity capital. An additional assumption is made that
banks are capital constrained in equilibrium because equity-capital is more costly than
other sources of funding such as deposits or bonds. Banks thus economize on their cost of
funding by holding no more than the required level of equity-capital, while also limiting
the size of their equity issues (p. 830). They explain that due to the endogenous cost of
equity-capital, multiple equilibriums may exist. In one equilibrium the endogenous cost
of capital, generated by self-fulfilling market beliefs is high, whereas in the other it is
low. The equilibrium associated with a higher endogenous cost of capital has all the
features of a credit crunch. These typical features are that: bank lending is limited by a
low endogenous stock of banking capital, there is a correspondingly lower volume of
bank credit, and the equilibrium bank spreads are high. In contrast, the other equilibrium
would show features such as: a high stock of bank capital, a high volume of credit, and
lower equilibrium bank spreads (Bolton and Freixas, 2006, p. 830).
Ultimately related, Glenn Hubbard (1995) asks the question of “how reasonable is
the money view?” as a stand-alone model for monetary policy transmission. First and
foremost, he further identifies key assumptions concerning intermediaries and borrowers
in the traditional interest rate view (money view) of the monetary transmission
11

mechanism. Hubbard (1995) details that banks offer “no special services on the asset side
of their balance sheet” (p.2). However, on the liability side of their balance sheet, banks
perform a special role. This role is one in which the banking system creates money by
way of demand deposit issues. Modigliani and Miller (1958) make the underlying
assumption that capital structures do not influence real decisions of borrowers and
lenders. Once this assumption is applied to banks, Fama (1980) reasoned that changes in
the public’s portfolio preferences among bank deposits, bonds or stocks shouldn’t have a
real economic effect. Thus, Hubbard (1995) poses one more question: is the financial
system merely a veil? (p. 2).
A simplified explanation of the money view model is as follows: There are two
assets, money and bonds. During a monetary contraction, the central bank essentially
reduces banking reserves, which limits the banking system’s ability to sell deposits due to
reserve requirements. Depositors would then hold more bonds and less money in their
portfolios. If prices do not instantly adjust to money supply changes, the decline in
household money holdings would equate to a decline in real money balances. In order to
return to equilibrium, the real rate of interest on bonds must increase, increasing the user
cost of capital for a plethora of investments activities, while interest-sensitive spending
falls (Hubbard, 1995, pp. 3-5).
Hubbard (1995) stresses that in order to be a useful and robust model in analyzing
the effects of monetary policy on real economic activity this “textbook model” relies on
four key assumptions:
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1. The central bank must control the supply of "outside money," for which there are
imperfect substitutes.
2. The central bank can affect real as well as nominal short-term interest rates (that
is, prices do not adjust instantaneously).
3. Policy-induced changes in real short-term interest rates affect longer-term interest
rates that influence household and business spending decisions.
4. Plausible changes in interest-sensitive spending in response to a monetary policy
innovation match reasonably well with observed output responses to such
innovations.

Within this framework, monetary policy is depicted by a change in the nominal
supply of outside money. However, the quantity of a large part of the monetary base is
very likely to be endogenous. For example, legal restrictions (such as reserve
requirements) may induce agents to use the outside asset for some transactions.
Empirically, we see the central bank’s influence over nominal short-term interest rates,
such as the federal funds rate, as a given. Bemanke and Blinder (1992) present evidence
that the real federal funds rate responds closely to a shift in monetary policy.
So what characterizes the “money view?” In simplest terms, the “money view” is
seen as focusing on aggregate, as opposed to distributional, consequences of policy
actions. With this in mind, higher default-risk-free rates of interest following a monetary
contraction depress desired investment by firms and households. While desired
investment falls, the reduction in business and household capital falls on the least
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productive projects. Hubbard (1995) argues that this is an incomplete view. He explains
that “such a view offers no analysis of distributional, or cross-sectional, responses to
policy actions, nor of aggregate implications of this heterogeneity” (p. 3).
The “credit view” transmission mechanism is considered to be a broader more
complete idea of how monetary policy affects the real economy. Hubbard (1995) explains
there is a macro concern associated with the “money view.” This concern is basically that
the cyclical movements in aggregate demand, particularly that of business fixed
investment and inventory investment, appears to be too large to be explained by monetary
policy actions that have not generally led to large changes in real interest rates. This
shortfall has led some macroeconomists to identify/propose financial factors in
propagating relatively small shocks, essentially factors that correspond to accelerator
models that explain investment data relatively well. Bemanke, Gertrude, and Gilchrest
(1991) refer to this as a “financial accelerator,” the magnification of initial shocks by
financial markets. A “credit view” offers to fill in the void of missing movement in the
investment data. One implication of the model of the financial accelerator is that
uncollateralized external finance becomes more expensive than internal finance. The
second implication is that the spread between the external and internal finance varies
inversely with the borrower’s net worth, internal funds and collateralizable resources,
relative to the amount of funds required. As well, another implication is that an adverse
shock to a borrower’s net worth increases external finance cost while decreasing the
borrower’s ability to implement investment, employment, and production plans.
Combined, these channels are what provide the accelerator according to Hubbard (1995),
magnifying an initial shock to net worth (pp. 3-6).
14

Finally, this argument is extended to incorporate a channel for monetary policy,
key to the “credit view,” and relevant for examination of the credit crunch phenomenon.
In the “money view” model, monetary policy actions affect the overall level of real
interest rates and interest sensitive spending. In contrast, the “credit view,” a model of
information-related financial frictions relies upon an essential gap between the cost of
external and internal finance for many borrowers. Thus, the “credit view” offers channels
in which monetary policy affects this gap, via open market operations or regulatory
actions. The “credit view” therefore encompasses distributional consequences of policy
action, as the costs of finance responds differently for different types of borrowers by
way of two channels: financial constraints on borrowers, and the existence of bankdependent borrowers. This continues to support our findings that a credit crunch may
simply become a phenomenon of inequitable bank lending, and not merely a decline in
overall bank loans.

IV.

Literature Review

a. Entering the Credit Crunch
Paul Mizen (2008) examines what was then known to be the “Credit Crunch of
2007-2008.” He finds that a credit crunch had begun as a localized problem among
lower-quality U.S. mortgage lenders. However, as defaults in subprime mortgages and its
associated adverse effects began to become more persistent, the view that subprime
mortgage defaults were isolated incidents began to be put into question. Some of these
cases of subprime mortgage defaults are as follows: an increase in subprime mortgage
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defaults in February 2007 (followed by a decrease by March), the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
of New Century Financial (a subprime mortgage specialist) in April of 2007, and the
closing of the Dillon Reed hedge fund by Swiss-owned investment bank UBS in May
2007 (incurring $125 million in subprime mortgage related losses). These losses began to
make many ratings agencies reassess their “safe” AAA ratings which they had given
subprime related mortgage products. For instance, in the same month that UBS had
closed the Dillon Reed hedge fund, Moody’s announced that it would review 62 asset
groups based on 21 U.S. subprime mortgage securitizations. Soon after, in June 2007,
Bear Steams took the role of supporting two failing hedge funds. In addition to this, from
June to July 2007, three leading ratings agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch
Ratings, all had downgraded mortgage related subprime products from their AAA “safe”
rating status. Adding to these events, large losses were experienced by Countrywide, a
U.S. mortgage bank, and European banks IKB and BNP Paribas. While Countrywide was
eventually taken over by Bank of America, IKB and BNP Paribas were not as fortunate,
both eventually closing their hedge funds. According to Mizen (2008), these
circumstances and ensuing effects had led to a full-scale credit crunch from 2007-2008.

b. Examining the Credit Boom Prior to the Bust
While the circumstances which had apparently led to a credit crunch in 2007-2008
are essential, it is equally important to examine the circumstances which had led to
economic growth and credit expansion prior. Mizen (2008) points to two important
circumstances. The first being “The Great Moderation,” a period of impressively tranquil
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macroeconomic conditions, combined with a global savings glut, an inflow of global
savings from emerging and oil-exporting countries. This resulted in lower long-term
interest rates and reduced macroeconomic volatility, fertile conditions for economic
growth and increased investment. The second development was the expansion of
securitization of subprime mortgage-backed assets, which produced increasingly
sophisticated financial assets with good credit ratings and relatively high yields (Mizen,
2008, p.533). This period of low nominal short-term interest rates, low inflation, and
steady growth is considered to be a main factor of the impressive credit expansion. This
credit expansion was even considered by many economists, such as Dell’Ariccia, Igan,
and Laeven (2008), to be excessive and termed a “credit boom.” This boom has been
argued to be a product of Federal Reserve policy under Alan Greenspan, of cutting short
term interest rates in response to the 9/11 attacks (and ensuing recession) and the dotcom
bubble-burst period. However, it is notable that interest rates abroad, such as those
prevalent in the euro area and the United Kingdom, were not as low as those in the
United States, but they also experienced a credit expansion. The influence of low real
short-term interest rates, rising house prices, and the stable economic conditions of the
Great Moderation on the expansion of credit is hard to argue against, but there is also
another important factor which likely influenced the growth. The U.S. economy was also
experiencing the effects of a global savings glut coming from Japan, China, Germany,
and the oil exporters which kept long-term interest rates down (Mizen, 2008, p. 534).
Furthermore, the second development to spur credit expansion, possibly to the
point of over-expansion, was the growth in the subprime mortgage market during this
period. The impressive returns and growth in the housing market during this period led to
17

a race to get a foothold on the housing ladder. Borrowers continued to seek funds to
claim their stake in the housing market, while being reassured by the fact that housing
prices continued to rise and were expected to maintain this momentum. Lenders were
reassured that the housing prices would continue to rise due to increased demand for
credit. In total, there were excessively optimistic assumptions and expectations of
continued real estate price increases, combined with what appeared to be limited risk.
Eventually, lenders were willing to extend their scope to include lower-quality
mortgages, such as subprime mortgages (Mizen, 2008, p. 535).
The growth of the subprime mortgage market is an impressive one. Jaffe (2008)
details two important periods of exceptional subprime mortgage growth, occurring first in
the late 1990’s, followed up by another growth spurt from 2002-2006. The first period of
the late 1990’s saw an expansion of subprime lending, rising to $150 billion, 13 percent
of total annual mortgage originations. The second period of subprime mortgage growth,
from 2002-2006, was even more impressive, rising from $160 billion in 2001 to $600
billion by 2006, more than 20 percent of all mortgage originations. The main factors
behind this extraordinary growth are often debated. For instance, Chomsisengphet and
Pennington-Cross (2006) argue that the driving factor behind the growth in subprime
mortgage lending was due to changes in the law, which allowed for mortgage lending
with high interest rates and fees, as well as tax advantages for secured borrowing versus
unsecured borrowing. In addition, another plausible driving factor was the desire of
mortgage originators to maintain the volume of new mortgages for securitization by
expanding lending into previously untapped markets (Mizen, 2008, p.536). This market
penetration seemed to be focused in urban areas of cities where home ownership had
18

previously been uncommon, areas such as Detroit, Miami, Riverside, Orlando, Las
Vegas, and Phoenix. As well, subprime mortgage securitization allowed for market
penetration into economically depressed regions of Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana. This
may have been due to a shift of prime borrowers facing financial difficulties switching to
subprime mortgages.

c. What is a Credit Crunch?
While we have loosely referenced a credit crunch to this point, it is essential to
establish more accurately what we consider to be a true “credit crunch.” Bemanke and
Lown (1991) define a bank credit cmnch as a “significant leftward shift in the supply
curve for bank loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of
potential borrows” (p. 207). This definition tells us that any reductions in the supply of
credit due to changes in the riskiness of investments or returns on investments should not
be considered as a crunch. A credit crunch however would be a decrease in the supply of
bank credit beyond the level at which a bank would like to lend, based upon their
maximizing level of safe lending given demand.

d. Implications of a Credit Crunch
Before we examine the tools/methods which have been used previously to
determine the presence of either credit crunch before, during, or after the Great
Recession, it is necessary to take a look at the implications it may present to the

19

economy. Paul Mizen (2008) raises a very important question, which appears to often be
overlooked during debate about the presence of credit crunch and its effects. This
question is very basic: “Should a credit crunch be present, should government interaction
be used to intervene?” To many in the economics field, this may be a simple question
with a simple answer of “yes!” However, it is important to detail the tradeoff which the
banking system undergoes when intervention occurs. According to Mizen (2008), when a
central bank decides to intervene during a credit crunch, they take part in a tradeoff. The
tradeoff is as follows: by providing liquidity to banks to help banks meet their desired
levels of capital, or to help banks reach a certain capital-to-assets ratio associated with a
risk-based capital adequacy regulation, they also increase bank insolvency. This is due to
the fact that by increasing the capital-to-asset ratio, the capital position of banks, the
Federal Reserve also increases the level of lending of these banks, as well as the level of
risk which banks take on. This is especially true during recession, as the levels of safe
investments (and returns) are diminished. The good part of this tradeoff is that by
increasing the capital position of banks, the Federal Reserve has essentially allowed for
increased lending, allowing for investment which is a main factor in economic growth
and recovery. However, while a central bank may alleviate a capital crunch by injecting
liquidity into the banking system, allowing for economic growth and recovery, it is also
allowing banks to become more insolvent, a problem which could set back an economy
even further should this lending lead to non-performing loans and bank insolvency. Thus,
the Federal Reserve does not face a “win-win” solution of simply injecting liquidity into
the banking system during a credit crunch; instead they need to examine the tradeoff of
this action, while also determining how much to inject and how quickly.
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In addition to the seemingly simple question of whether a credit crunch should be
remedied, another interesting aspect is whether credit crunches are intentional or
unintentional products of government regulation intended to correct for market
imperfections and risky lending, or even as an effect of banks self-imposing lending
restrictions in order to buffer increased levels of future loan defaults. The tradeoff of
Federal Reserve policy which limits credit creation through increasing capital-to-asset
ratios, reserve requirements, or removing liquidity from the markets has already been
covered, but more importantly when having a discussion on credit crunch, one needs to
examine whether the Federal Reserve has intentionally limited bank lending as a means
to limit perceived risky lending such as that in the subprime mortgage market. Federal
Reserve policy may aim to limit lending in certain markets, such as the subprime
mortgage market in order to improve bank solvency, but may also have the effect of
spawning a credit crunch which inhibits overall lending and economic performance.
Another issue concerning the credit crunch phenomenon is raised by Fabian
Valencia (2008), in which he examines whether public funds should be used to
recapitalize banks following a significant deterioration in their capital position. This has
been the case with the Great Recession, as banks’ capital positions and thus capital-toasset ratios have diminished. Valencia (2008) shows that a transitory shock is capable of
generating a persistent credit crunch, even if this shock is a one-time event. He argues
that this shock could have important real effects on the economy, especially if firms are
highly dependent on bank-intermediated credit (p. 15). In order to escape this credit
crunch, banks must increase their solvency. However, due to circumstances which have
caused the credit crunch, such as a recession or financial crisis, the options to recapitalize
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are limited. Valencia (2008) makes the assumption that banks are unable to recapitalize
through raising equity-capital from shareholders, leaving public funds as a last ditch
effort to recapitalize. In addition, should public funds be used for recapitalization, it
should come as a one-time unexpected event from the perspective of the bank, as
expected recapitalization would most likely alter bank behavior and incentives.
The recapitalization of the banking system using public funds seems to be exactly
what Ben Bemanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, utilized in 2008 with the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). TARP allowed for the United States Department of the
Treasury to purchase and insure up to $700 Billion of troubled assets. This program was
used to buy troubled assets and equity from financial institutions, allowing banks to not
only shed many toxic loans which they would expect to turn non-performing in the
future, but also to recapitalize through asset and equity purchases. Furthermore, Valencia
(2008) finds that the financial health of the banking system may be a significant
contributor to the propagation of economic shocks, notably negative shocks. The
precautionary motive of banks may insulate bank lending from smaller shocks, but the
economic consequences of larger shocks and ensuing credit crunch may be significantly
adverse. With this in mind, it presents the argument for government bailouts in the form
of recapitalization policies as a reasonable response during episodes of systemic financial
pressures due to the real economic consequences of allowing the banking system to enter
credit crunch.
Valencia (2008) notes the constraints which banks face in raising funds a result of
market imperfections, implying that as solvency declines, funding costs increase (p. 4).
One way in which banks may try to restore balance sheets back to their optimal level
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after an adverse shock to their capital position would be with a reduction in dividend
payments. This however may prove to be insufficient to restore solvency back to the
optimal level. Should this prove to be insufficient, banks may then choose to reduce
lending, restoring solvency only gradually through retained earnings (p 4). Another
interesting aspect to the model proposed by Valencia (2008) is that banks exhibit a
precautionary motive in which an increase in credit risk would cause banks to increase
their capital levels, which essentially raises bank solvency. This seems to be a
reoccurring relationship when dealing with bank behavior, credit risk, and credit crunches
- that credit crunches may in fact stem from banks themselves, as a way to increase bank
solvency in light of increased credit risk, which may very well be the case with the Great
Recession. Thus, it may be the somewhat contradictory case that when credit risk
increases, so does bank solvency, as an increase of credit risks would lead to an increase
in the optimal level of capital.
One perpetuating view in economics seems to be that credit crunches are spurred
by government regulation, a thorn in the side of banks who wish to lend at higher levels
than allowed for by regulation. However, there is also the possibility that credit crunches
are created by banking policy itself. A credit crunch may be intentional, attributed to the
fact that banks may have restricted lending in an attempt to increase their capital position,
as a hedge against future loan defaults (non-performing loans). This may worsen a
recession, since market risk increases during recession, and this risk may have the effect
of causing banks to decrease overall lending. If this is the case, then credit crunch has not
come from government regulation, but from banks determining their maximizing level of
lending, which due to increased risk and recession has shifted to the left.
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Furthermore, there appears to be a tradeoff between the cost of borrowing and the
level of lending present during recession. According to Bemanke (1991), during
recession there appears to be a tightening of credit standards. This tightening of credit
standards however does not equate to a systematic decline in lending. Evidence is present
that while credit standards are increased during recession, with lower levels of lending,
credit which is created appears to be at a slightly lower cost (nominal terms). This would
mean that banks take the position of increasing credit standards and decreasing levels of
lending overall, but appear to be more focused towards lending to safe investments at a
lower nominal rate. Therefore, while the level of lending shifts to the left, the cost of
borrowing may actually decrease (Bemanke 1991).

e. The Inequitable Credit Crunch - Supply and Demand Effects
So far we have defined and examined potential factors contributing to a credit
crunch, but we have yet to raise the important question - How does a credit crunch affect
the real economy? As well, who bears the brunt of the burden? Bemanke (1991) explains
that if there is a credit crunch, by way of a capital shortage (“capital crunch”) which
reduces bank lending below its economically desirable level, two potential concerns for
public policy may develop. If bank lending takes a leftward shift, this means that bank
dependent borrowers will find it more difficult or costly to acquire credit. This may even
be viewed as inequitable if it predominantly affects bank dependent borrowers mostly,
such as small business. Furthermore, there may be significant long-term implications if it
is the case that small business plays an important part in the development of products and
product processes, essentially technological progress (p. 228). Bemanke (1991) finds that
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small borrowers suffered inequitably from the reduction in bank lending during the 19901991 economic downturn, as well as pointing to a Gertruler and Gilchrist (1991) study
which showed that small manufacturing firms grew considerably more slowly than large
firms after 1991:1 (p. 229). Secondly, there is the concern that reduced bank lending due
to a capital crunch may adversely affect economic activity, with adverse effects to both
aggregate demand and supply. Aggregate supply would shift leftward due to reduced
access to working capital, potentially resulting in firms reducing employment and
delaying investment plans, leading to reduced short-run and long-run output.
The potential demand effects have been worked out in an IS-LM context by
Bemanke and Blinder (1988), with the additional assumption that bank loans are an
imperfect substitution for other assets such as bonds and money. The effects of a capital
shortage on aggregate demand is as follows: “given the safe real interest rate, the net
return to investment for a bank-dependent borrower depends not only on the marginal
product of the proposed investment but also on the cost of financial intermediation (the
difference between the safe real interest rate and effective cost of funds to the bankdependent borrower)” (Bemanke, 1991, p. 229). Essentially this means that an exogenous
decline in bank willingness to lend would either: cut off bank-dependent borrowers
entirely, increase the cost of bank-dependent borrowing, or force them to seek more
costly alternate forms of credit. The result is a leftward shift in the IS curve, at any given
safe real interest rate, as the investment demand of bank-dependent borrowers declines
(due to the decline in net return on investment). The overall effect of these adverse shifts
would be a contraction to the macroeconomy.
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f. The Role of Credit vs. Other Extensions of Credit
As Bemanke (1991) points out, should an exogenous decline in the banking
system’s willingness to lend take place, bank dependent borrowers may be forced to seek
alternative forms of credit. The adverse macroeconomic effects of a credit crunch,
however, rely on the assumption that these alternative forms of credit be significantly
costlier to investors, reducing the net return to investment, and thus investment demand.
On the other hand, if alternative forms of credit are easily substitutable with bank credit,
so that the reduction in bank lending results in a marginal change in the cost of credit for
borrowers, then the reduction in the supply of bank loans will produce only a limited
economic effect (p. 231).
Bemanke (1991) examines data concerning the behavior of commercial-industrial
loans by domestically chartered commercial banks and five alternative sources of short to
medium term business credit over the previous six recessions (p. 231). This data is used
to examine the degree to which alternative forms of credit have substituted for bank loans
in each of these recessionary periods (1960,1969, 1973,1980,1981, and 1990). The
alternative sources of commercial and industrial credit examined are: foreign banks,
saving and loans, non-financial commercial paper, finance company business credit, and
trade credit. The data shows an interesting aspect to the 1990 recession when compared
to prior recessions, specifically concerning the growth in non-financial commercial paper.
Prior to the 1990 recession, slowdowns in bank lending have been followed by increased
growth in non-financial commercial paper issuance. Bemanke explains that Kashyap,
Stein, and Wilcox (1993) interpret this substitution as support for the view that the
majority of previous recessions have been the result of monetary policy induced
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slowdowns in the supply of bank lending (p. 231). However, the data also shows that the
1990 recession breaks this trend, as non-financial commercial paper actually declined.
Bemanke (1991) explains that “this decline is surprising if one believes that a credit
crunch was an important force in the recession, since the expectation is that, in a credit
crunch, firms that are able to substitute commercial paper for bank loans would do so” (p.
231). The explanation which Bemanke (1991) uses for the breaking of the trend in
domestic bank loan substitution is that there must have been an overall decline in credit
demand, possibly due to the borrowers’ weak balance sheets.
Furthermore, other evidence for the view that demand factors were dominant in
the 1990 recession is also shown by Bemanke (1991) when viewing data which compares
the recession with the previous year (1989:2-1990:2). These findings are that in the short
to medium term lending business credit category, domestic bank commercial and
industrial lending grew 2.8 percent in this pre-recession period, while finance company
business credit grew 9.7 percent, foreign bank commercial and industrial lending grew
9.7 percent, and non-financial commercial paper grew 9.7 percent. He views this as being
consistent with the view that a credit crunch in the banking system was in progress during
this pre-recession period and even during the recession period, but inconsistent with the
view that a reduction in bank loans was a dominant factor in the recession (p. 235). This
is because the data suggests that there was a substitution from bank lending to alternative
forms of credit during the pre-recession period, possibly leading to a recession. However,
due to the simultaneous slowdown in the domestic bank loans as well as alternative forms
of credit, one cannot conclude that the supply of credit played an important role, but
rather credit demand was the dominant factor.
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g. “Credit Crunch” and “Capital Crunch”: Introducing the Risk-Based
Capital Standard and its Potential Restrictions On Bank Lending
Wako Watanabe (2007) however, finds evidence for a credit crunch during the
1990 recession, as well as a greater explanation of what should be referred to as a
“regulatory driven capital crunch.” He explains that the 1990-1991 recession period
showed an observed drop in bank lending in the U.S., which had become known as a
“credit crunch.” Due to its occurrence during this deep recessionary period, it had
attracted deserved attention from politicians and media alike. Bemanke and Lown (1991)
also observe that in the New England region, the area which experienced the steepest
declines in bank lending, lending had fell by more than 10% in the same year period
(1990:2-1991:1) (Watanabe, 2007, p. 642). What’s more, in 1995, Peek and Rosenberg
observed that during this same period, there had been a simultaneous large drop in bank
capital. This phenomenon, assumedly relating capital levels to bank loan levels, became
known as a “capital crunch.” Therefore it is important to keep in mind that when dealing
with a “credit crunch,” we may be more specifically talking about a “capital crunch.”
Watanabe (2007) explains that “the major explanation for the credit crunch phenomenon
is the ‘regulatory driven capital crunch hypothesis’” (p. 642). This regulatory driven
capital crunch hypothesis usually centers on the internationally recognized bank capital
regulation know as the risk-based (adjusted) capital (RBC) standard, a key element of the
banking regulatory framework. This regulation requires a ratio of equity capital to riskweighted assets not to fall below a specified minimum threshold. These standards set a
risk weight of 100% for loans, regardless of the credit worthiness of the borrower, while
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assigning a risk weight of 0% to assets such as government bonds of OECD countries.
These regulations had gone partially into effects by the time the U.S. had entered into the
credit crunch period of 1990-1991.
This capital-to-asset ratio requirement has been the focus of many economists
examination of the phenomenon of credit crunch (from this point onward I will use the
term credit crunch interchangeably with a capital crunch, under the assumption that
capital crunches are the main driver of credit crunches). Watanabe (2007) explains that
theoretical work has shown there is a problem of asymmetric information between
investors, banks, and borrowers, which appears to raise the cost of acquiring new equity.
This assumption is used to show that undercapitalized banks who fail to meet the
regulatory capital-to-asset ratio may face a hard time raising capital to satisfy the
regulatory minimum. Due to the high cost of raising equity capital, due to the asymmetric
information problem, banks would likely shift to modifying their asset holdings (the

denominator of the K/A ratio) by cutting back on lending in order to satisfy regulatory
standards. Furthermore, the easiest way to raise their capital-to-asset ratio would be to
shift their portfolio from loans, which have a 100% risk weight, to government bonds of
OECD countries, which have a risk weight of 0%.
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h. Capital Constraints and Their Sub-Optimal Outcome - The
Procyclicality of Capital Requirements and the Effects of Binding Capital
Constraints
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman (2002) examine capital constraints even
further, as well as highlighting the potential for previously unbinding constraints to
become binding at the most vulnerable point, at the bottom of a business cycle. Bliss and
Kaufman (2002) explain that the simple one-constraint (reserve requirements) model of
monetary policy, which changes the supply of deposits and assets of the banking system
by injecting or withdrawing reserves, is incomplete (p. 30). They explain that banks are
subject to two constraints, adding a capital constraint to the model. Furthermore, should
capital constraints be binding, an injection of additional reserves by the Federal Reserve
may not reach the intended increase in bank deposits and earning assets. Therefore, if
either one of these constraints is binding, banks are unable to increase earning assets. As
well, the Federal Reserve would appear to be limited in their ability further in the fact
that they are only able to directly influence one of these constraints, the reserve
requirement, appearing impotent to affect the capital constraint. The fact is that while
monetary policy seeks to expand bank earning assets (loans), it will only be able to do
this through the reserve injection mechanism only if the effective capital requirement is
not binding, or as Bliss and Kaufman (2002) point out, market conditions are conducive
for banks to profitably raise the additional required capital (p. 30). What this tells us is
that the Fed needs to take both the reserve requirement and capital constraint, as well as
whether either appear to be binding, into account when proposing monetary policy. This
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is especially important during an economic downturn, as banks already experience
increased difficulties in raising capital.
In addition, Bliss and Kaufman (2002) believe that due to the presence of both
constraints, Fed monetary policy may be asymmetrical in economic effectiveness, that
monetary policy may be more effective to inhibit growth, or “slow an overheated
expansion.” If this is a desirable goal of Fed monetary policy, it may do so
unambiguously and effectively by draining excess reserves. Particularly, banks would be
forced to reduce their lending and investment in assets as they cannot maintain the level
of deposits to support these investments (p. 30). Excess capital, in the presence of a non
binding capital restraint, would then likely be held if needed to account for anticipated
nonperformance of loans, or reduce the excess capital through stock buy-backs, dividend
increases, or acquisitions (pp. 29-31).
Furthermore, it is noted that bank capital levels appear to fluctuate through the
business cycle, as capital ratios appear to be higher during economic expansion, while
capital ratios appear to be lower during economic contraction. In addition to this fact, it
also appears that effective capital requirements may also increase during economic
downturns if it is risk sensitive, as is currently the case under the requirements developed
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Bliss and Kaufman (2002) explain that
“required regulatory capital would increase as the credit risk of the loan portfolio
increases. This is likely to occur in a downturn. Not only do more loans default, but the
default risk of performing loans in the aggregate tends to increase, as does the expected
loss when default occurs” (p. 28). This means that the risk-weights applied to bank assets
increases, which translates to an increase in the regulatory required capital which banks
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are required to hold against the assets. Therefore, during recession, which increases the
default risk of loans, banks are able to support fewer assets even if their capital levels
remain unchanged (p. 28).

i. A Brief History on Banking Regulation: Capital Requirements
As we have already mentioned in short detail, banks are not solely subject to the
Fed’s reserve requirements, but also to capital requirements. It is worthwhile to detail this
requirement and its development a bit further, as these requirements play a major part in
much of credit crunch theory. The framework for the current banking regulation has been
determined from the Basel Accords, which are banking supervision accords,
recommendations on banking laws and regulations. These banking laws and regulations
are recommendations made by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).
The “Basel Accords” reference comes from the fact that the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision keeps its office at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel,
Switzerland, where the committee typically meets to develop banking policy.
Originally, the BCBS was comprised of representatives from central banks and
regulatory authorities of the Group of Ten countries plus Spain and Luxembourg.
However, since 2009, all of the G-20 major economies are represented, in addition to
other major banking areas such as Hong Kong and Singapore. It is important to note that
the committee does not have the authority to enforce these recommendations. However,
most member countries tend to implement the BCBS policies through their national laws
and regulations, in which some time may take place between recommendation and
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implementation. Furthermore, the Basel Accords are ongoing and evolving
recommendations, experiencing multiple “rounds” of deliberation and recommendation,
so it is also important to examine the changes which have taken place, as well as changes
expected to take place on the horizon.
Basel I: was the round of deliberation by central bank representatives from the
Group of Ten, which in 1988 the Basel Committee (BCBS) in Basel, Switzerland,
published their recommendations for a set of minimal capital requirements for banks. The
1988 Basel Accords as it had come to be known was enforced into law by the Group of
Ten countries by 1992.
The role of Basel I was to focus primarily on credit risk. The regulation required
that bank assets be classified and grouped into five categories according to credit risk.
The bank assets would carry risk weights of zero (such assets as home country sovereign
debt), ten, twenty, fifty, and up to one hundred percent (typically corporate debt).
Furthermore, the framework requires that banks with an international presence are
required to maintain capital equal to 8% of the risk-weighted assets. However, banks who
felt the 8% requirement to be unreasonable (such as JP Morgan Chase), were able to
implement credit default swaps which effectively decreased the required amount of
capital to a mere 1.6% of assets. This framework has been implemented in the G-10
countries, although varying slightly in aspects as date of implementation and efficiency
of enforcement. As well, over 100 other countries have adopted the principles of Basil I,
although not quite as efficient as the Group of Ten.
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The contribution of Basel I was to establish a common international definition of
bank capital, divided into two tiers. Tier 1 capital consists of common stockholder equity
and disclosed reserves, with the exception of some forms of preferred stock that U.S.
holdings companies also include. Tier 2 capital consists of any combination of eligible
capital elements approved by national regulators. Furthermore, it is important to note that
the previous mention of a required 8% capital base is dependent on the sum of both tiers,
however at least half of this (4%) must be met by tier 1 capital.
The use of credit default swaps, a form of credit insurance, and its link to the
Basel Accords is a very interesting development. To see how Basel I may have played a
role in the CDS market, assume a bank would buy a contract from an insurer to cover the
credit risk of a derivative. This insurance would require the bank to pay a fee, much like
that of an auto insurance premium, and if the derivative should turn bad (ie: the loan
failed to pay), the insurance company would be obligated to cover the bank’s loss. Aside
from the obvious benefit of insuring a CDS, the incentive which is more relevant to our
discussion of credit crunches and the Basel Accords is the rating effect of the insurance
company. If the bank buys a credit default swap for their derivatives from an AAA-rated
insurance company, the effect is that the derivative itself takes on an AAA rating. The
effect of gaining an AAA rating is that the bank’s capital requirement is reduced, freeing
up more capital and allowing the bank to invest further into derivatives.
Basel II: Published in June 2003, the second of the Basel Accords issued by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Basel II set new recommendations on
banking laws and regulations to create a new international standard for banking
regulators to use in establishing capital requirements to safeguard against financial and
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operational risks banks typically face. The merits of the new international standard were
proclaimed to protect the international financial system from the problems that arise
should a major bank or system of banks collapse. In other words, Basil II built upon Basil
I and attempted to safeguard bank solvency and economic stability by setting up risk and
capital management requirements designed to ensure that banks hold a proper level of
capital reserves appropriate to the risks which these banks expose themselves to through
their asset acquisitions (lending and investment practices).
In short, the changes in Basel II were to ensure that capital allocation be more risk
sensitive, separating operational risk from credit risk and quantifying the two, while also
attempting to align economic and regulatory capital more closely in order to reduce the
scope for regulatory arbitrage. Currently, there is a new revision to the Basel Accords in
development, referred to as Basel III by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in
September 2010. As the update is still in the draft stages, we will not discuss much of the
changes, as they would have had zero impact on current or past credit crunch.

j. The Systematic Under-Estimation of Risk
The financial collapse which has led to the Great Recession of 2007-2009 has
been endlessly examined and prodded, with financial, policy, and social experts placing
blame all around. However, a lot of blame has been placed on the under-estimation of
risk presented by many of the assets, most notably subprime mortgage-backed securities,
during this period. Interestingly, this problem of under-estimating risk is not a new
phenomenon, as evident by Ben Bemanke (1991). Bemanke (1991) points to the problem
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of bank examiners systematically underestimating bank losses and risk in the past. Due to
the limited scope of this paper, we will not look at the questions which have been raised
concerning moral hazard and other potential contributing factors. However, we examine
an interesting question much aligned to the earlier question of whether the “problem” of a
credit crunch should be remedied - What would be the effect of bank examiners moving
to a more “fair” assessment? Bemanke (1991) explains that if bank examiners move to a
more “fair” and essentially accurate assessment, the effect would be to reduce lending, as
risk and lending are negatively related. Furthermore, should this reduced lending occur,
do we consider this to be a credit crunch, or merely banks making a correction towards
their optimal level of lending? It could also be argued that the previous “unfair” level of
lending should be considered a “credit bubble.” An interesting point that Bemanke
(1991) makes on this topic is that a systematic underestimation of risk does not however
point to a problem of bias or support a view that examination procedures are
systematically lax. What this would prove however is that “examiners are no better than
bankers at forecasting systematic problems like the LDC debt crisis or the sharp declines
in real estate values in some regions of the United States” (p. 218).

k. Overzealous Regulation: Empirical Evidence
Bemanke (1991) continues to peer into the issue of the role played by regulation
and whether banking regulation has become overzealous, as well as whether it played a
key role in the perceived credit crunch of 1990-1991, a recessionary period typically
considered to be similar on the surface as the Great Recession. As has already been
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covered, Bemanke (1991) has argued that an increase in the regulatory response from
bank regulators does not itself provide evidence for overzealous regulation due to the fact
that prior regulation has systematically underestimated risk. In order to address this issue,
commercial bank data (1981-1990), particularly concerning banks’ loan losses and
capital charges (via the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) are examined. These
provisions for loan losses and net charge-offs represent the funds set aside by banks in
anticipation of loan losses and the realization of those losses, as determined by regulators.
The accumulated stock of loan loss provisions less net charge-offs are termed “loan-loss
reserves.”
The data shows a pattern in which banks during this period generally made loanloss provisions higher than the net charge-offs (about 1/3 annually), which led to a steady
increase in the accumulation of loan-allowances. Bernanke (1991) believes this buildup
in loan loss reserves was a response to the LDC debt crisis and other long-term problems
which had caused banks to accumulate increasing levels of losses (net charge-offs), not
due to a problem of overzealous regulation. Therefore, the explanation offered by
Bemanke (1991) of the reduction in bank loans is a reduction in capital due to loan
losses, rather than an increase in capital requirements or other forms of banking
regulation.
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1. Market Imperfection: Asymmetric Information, Bank Runs, Regulatory
Response, and the Unintended Consequence of Credit Crunch
Thomas Bemauer and Vally Koubi (2002) examine the role of banking regulation
in hard times, in particular the relationship between business cycles, bank failure, and
bank capital in the “credit crunch dilemma.” First and foremost it is important to examine
the conventional wisdom concerning the justification of government regulation in the
banking sector. This justification typically relies on the ideal that government regulation
is needed to correct market failures due to public goods, externalities, monopolies, or
asymmetric information between buyer and seller. The justification of banking regulation
relies on the latter market failure, a problem of asymmetric information in which
depositors or investors are unable to effectively gauge their banks viability, as well as the
more general risk of bank panic and wider systemic crisis. From a regulation standpoint,
a bank panic, as has often been the case in the past, may spill over from weak to
economically more viable banks, triggering a systemic crisis in the entire financial sector
(p. 64).
Bernauer (2002) details two theories which have been used to explain bank
panics. The first theory views bank panics as random events, unrelated to “real”
economic health, as determined by economic data and indicators, but rather relies upon
the interpretations and beliefs of the individual and/or collective. The bank panic is rather
like a self fulfilling prophecy as the “first-come-first-serve” rule for bank repurchases of
deposits or other investments acts to increase the probability of a banking system
collapse. It is argued by Diamond and Dybvig (1983, p. 410) that “.. .anything that causes
(depositors/investors) to anticipate a run (bank panic) will lead to a run.” Causes could
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range from bad earnings reports, an observed run at other banks, a negative government
forecast, even to something as meaningless as sun spots - what is important is not the real
cause and effect, but rather the perceived cause and effect which triggers the loss of
depositor/investor confidence to a point of panic (Bernauer, and Koubi, 2002, p. 64).
A second theory suggests that panics stem from events which change
depositors’/investors’ perception of the risks which banks take. As has already been
mentioned, the problem of asymmetric information between depositors/investors and
banks creates a situation in which depositors/investors are unable to accurately assess the
riskiness of one bank from the next, and instead will rely on aggregate information,
treating all banks and their associated risks, as one in the same. This “fallacy of
composition” leads a collapse of one bank (or the possibility of collapse), to spill over to
other viable banks, as well as adversely affecting the real economy. All banks are then
treated as being riskier, although it is the case that only a few banks have become less
solvent. It has been estimated that banking crises on average, have accounted for
cumulative output losses of 10-15% of GDP over the past 25 years according to the Bank
of England (The Economist, 2003). Importantly, this type of theory makes the
assumption that bank panics stem from recession as a large number of depositors and
investors would expect an increase in bank failures (p. 64).
Bernauer (2002) points to ways in which the probability of banks runs (and
system risk) may be reduced. Some of these measures include the establishment of
“narrow banks” (banks which invest only in low-risk assets), funding of banks with more
equity as opposed to more demand deposits, greater transparency, the use of the central
bank as a lender of last resort, and deposit insurance (p. 65). While these policies may
39

contribute to a more sound and solvent banking system through the insulation from bank
runs, as is typically the case when dealing with economic policy, many of these face
serious drawbacks or trade-offs. Such downsides include: reduced investment associated
with the creation of “narrow banks” (particularly within the economic sectors with
greater risk, but potentially greater opportunity), as well as the moral hazard problem
associated with a lender of last resort and depository insurance policy which both create
incentives for banks and depositors/investors to accept risks which they would not
otherwise accept.
In lieu of these trade-offs, the “obvious response” (Berger, Herring, and Szego,
1995) has been to develop policy which requires banks to increase their levels of capital
relative to assets (capital-to-asset ratio) in order to offset weaknesses in the banking
system. This “fix” to correct for the problems associated with asymmetrical information
problems in the banking system relies on the assumption that more capital helps to create
a larger financial cushion for banks in case of larger than expected losses and/or bank
runs. A second assumption is that “increasing equity capital implies that the respective
bank’s risk-taking has a greater effect on shareholders, motivating the latter to more
effectively monitor and, if necessary, constrain the management’s risk-taking behavior
(p. 65). Finally, aside from regulatory pressures, banks may also face pressure from the
markets which may lead banks to increase their capital-to-asset ratios in general, but even
more so during recession, as a signal of solvency to the markets (which has been shown
to lower funding costs).
Just as other regulatory policies typically create tradeoffs, regulatory capital
requirements may possess unintended consequences, mainly a contraction in bank
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lending. As has already been established, banks face difficulty raising funds during
recession. Weak banks, according to lower capital-to-asset ratios, would be likely to turn
to divesting and limiting loans as a way to increase solvency, potentially triggering a
credit crunch. Bemauer finds that a credit crunch implies a refusal of banks to make
loans, even if borrowers are willing to pay an increased interest rate. As well, he finds
that there is also the effect of banks restricting the size of loans below the full amount
requested. This implies a rationing effect of a credit crunch, either on the basis of
rationing based on the credit worthiness of a borrower, limiting the size of loans granted,
or both.
Banks choose to rely on rationing because of the problem of asymmetric
information between lender and borrower, as a way to avoid adverse selection and
negative incentive effects. Bemauer (2002) explains that “raising interest rates might
reduce bank profits if adverse selection increases the average riskiness of potential
borrowers and incentive effects induce borrowers to switch from safe to risky projects
after obtaining the loan” (p. 66). Furthermore, by granting smaller loans and not lending
the foil amount desired by borrowers, banks can maximize the probability that the loans
will be paid back.
A looming question concerning credit crunch analysis comes down to whether the
supply or demand effects are dominant. A reduction of loans could be considered a credit
crunch, but this could be a mistake as a reduction of loans may be due to reduced demand
for deposits. However, the available evidence, according to many economists (Peek and
Rosengren, 1995, Mishkin, 1997), is that credit crunch stems from the banks’ reduced
willingness to lend. Further support for this view is offered by Hancock and Wilcox
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(1993) and Shrieves and Dahl (1995), concluding that U.S. banks made fewer loans to
reduce risk during the 1990-1991 period. However, the investigation into the same matter
by Berger and Udell (1994) concluded that there is little support for this hypothesis.
There is also a bit of debate as well into the role played by regulatory
requirements, such as regulatory capital requirements. Many economists have put the
blame of the early 1990’s credit crunch in the United States on the changes in the
regulatory capital requirements that took place following the first round of the Basel
Accords, Basel I. As well, there have been similar arguments made concerning the credit
crunch that took place during the mid to late 1990s in Japan. Hancock and Wilcox (1993)
find that regulatory capital actions based on leverage ratios, which mandates that banks
hold at least 3% capital to non-risk weighted assets, was a significant contributor to the
credit crunch. However, there is disagreement on the issue as Berger and Udell (1994) do
not find significant support for the regulatory driven credit crunch hypothesis.
Additional analysis of the 1988 Basel Accord is carried out by Haubrich and
Wachtel (1993), Furlong (1992), and Burger and Udell (1994), to determine whether the
8% capital requirement for private loans enticed banks to substitute their assets toward
government securities since the latter would only require a capital requirement of 0-1.6%.
The empirical evidence leads Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) and Furlong (1992) to
conclude that the risk based capital requirements set by the Basel Accord significantly
contributed to a credit crunch. However, Burger and Udell (1994) again are at odds with
the others, not finding significant evidence to show the Basel Accords as a contributing
factor.
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m. Securitization of Banks Loans: A Mirage of Credit Crunch?
So far we have only briefly touched on the effects of loan securitization, as we
stated that banks (such as JP Morgan Chase) who felt the 8% capital requirement set by
Basel I was unreasonable, were able to implement instruments such as credit default
swaps to effectively decrease the required amount of capital (down to mere 1.6% of
assets). The use of securitization provides a tool for lowering the level of capital required
by banks, allowing banks to free up capital to invest further. Another interesting aspect of
the effect of securitization is that it may produce a mirage of a credit crunch. Bemanke
(1991) explains that banks regularly initiate loans with the intent to sell off all or part of
their holdings to other investors. As specified by the Basel Accords, loans that are
securitized in such a manner do not appear on banks’ balance sheets. Therefore these
loans would not be counted in standards measures of bank loans. Thus, an apparent
slowdown in bank lending could actually be a mirage due to the growing popularity of
loan securitization, as an increase in the proportion of loan securitization would lead to a
decrease in the loan levels kept on a banks account. So while loans are still being made,
they may fail to appear when examining overall loan levels.
Typically, there are three types of assets which banks securitize: mortgages,
consumer credit, and commercial and industrial loans. While data on these types of assets
are a bit limited, it is still worthwhile to examine trends in their growth. Bemanke (1991)
finds that securitized consumer credit, although it is a small proportion of overall loans, is
growing rapidly. Making the assumption that all securitized consumer credit originates
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from banks (albeit an oversimplification), the “consumer and other” category of bank
loans shows an annualized growth rate of about 1.3 percent from 1990:2- 1991:1, not
quite insignificant, but a signal of slow growth in bank lending during this period (p.
215).
Unlike the consumer credit category, the securitized mortgage category was (in
1991), and has kept the trend, very large and rapidly growing. For example, the Flow of
Funds accounts in 1990 showed outstanding pools of securitized mortgages exceeding $1
trillion. This amount exceeded bank holdings of mortgages at the time, in which banks
held more than a quarter of the entire mortgage market. Still, this does not tell us exactly
the proportion of loans that were bank originated. However, Bemanke (1991) points to
the fact that during this recessionary period, bank holdings in 1-4 family mortgages were
the fastest growing holdings. This shows (according to Bemanke) that there was little
restriction of bank lending in the residential mortgage market.

n. Procyclicality of Capital-to-Asset Ratios to The Aggregate Economy
Bemauer (2002) examines yearly observations of the entire population of U.S.
banks over the 1990-1998 period in order to establish whether there is a relationship
between capital-to-asset ratios and aggregate economic conditions, more importantly
whether K/A is pro- or counter-cyclical. Pooled cross-section time series regression with
a fixed-effect procedure is used for the estimation of the cyclical behavior of the capitalto-asset ratio. The data used comes from the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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The dependent variable in the regression is the capital-to-asset ratio (k), measured
in terms of the risk-weighted Tier 1 capital-asset ratio (Tier 1 capital divided by total
risk-weighted assets). Bernauer (2002) regresses k on gdp growth during the period 19901998 in individual U.S. states where a bank is located. To account for omitted variable
bias, variables for return on equity (roe), and non-performing loans (nonp) are included.
As well, control variables for bank size: total value of assets (asset), and number of
employees (emp), are also included in the regression. The dummy variable (dumBA) is
included to capture the effect of the introduction of the Basel I Accord. It is noted that the
introduction of the Basel I Accord likely drove up capital-to-asset ratios because of
tougher regulation, but also due to increased market scrutiny. This follows that prior to
the Basel I Accord, it was more difficult for markets to assess and compare banks’
viability because there were no uniform criteria, making it harder for markets to punish
weak banks.
The results of the regression show a positive and statistically significant
correlation between k and gdp, indicating that bank capital-to-asset ratios are pro
cyclical. The results of the regression also suggest that higher returns on equity contribute
to a higher capital-to-asset ratio. Bank size and share of non-performing loans have a
negative correlation, showing a contribution to lower capital-to-asset ratios of banks.
More importantly, the regression shows that the implementation of the Basel I Accord in
the U.S. is correlated with an increase in bank capital-to-asset ratios. This supports the
view that regulators play an integral role in the capital levels of banks.
The pro-cyclical behavior of capital-to-asset ratios, which are higher in expansion
while lower in recession, may suggest that policy makers are on the average stricter on
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banks maintaining higher capital ratios during expansion and more lenient during
recession. This is explained by the dilemma which has already been touched upon, that
regulators face the trade-off of forcing banks to keep a certain level of capital vs. assets,
increasing a bank’s solvency, while having the effect of potentially creating a credit
crunch in which banks reduce their levels of lending to satisfy this requirement.
Therefore, if regulators correctly see this dilemma, they may choose to mitigate credit
crunch by acting more lenient during recession, leading to lower capital-to-asset ratios as
seen in the regression.
In order to folly establish whether policy-makers completely discount bank failure
and bank runs in order to mitigate the probability of credit crunch during recession,
Bemauer (2002) adds an interaction term (gdp*nonp) to determine whether the pro
cyclical behavior is uniform across banks independent of their vulnerability (p. 70). The
interaction term produces a positive coefficient, meaning that banks with higher levels of
non-performing loans, essentially weaker banks, are on average likely to have higher
levels of capital relative to assets.
Furthermore, Bemauer (2002) splits the sample to examine the behavior of the
capital-to-asset ratios for banks with a low capital-to-asset ratio (defined by banks with a
capital-to-asset ratio below the mean ratio by one standard deviation). This causes the
correlation between k and gdp to reverse, now showing a negative relationship. This
shows that the average weak bank strengthens its capital-to-asset ratio during periods of
economic downturn. Finally, the sample is split again into groups according to non
performing loans and return on equity, both indicators of a bank’s strength. The results
show that having a large share of non-performing loans or low return on equity does not
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produce a remedial effect on banks. This may suggest that these two indicators are not
paid much attention by regulators or the markets in determining the solvency of a bank.
The results of Bemauer’s (2002) regression analysis and insight is that regulators
do in fact realize the policy dilemma they face during economic downturn, and this
appears to influence their regulatory response. He explains that “regulators appear willing
to prevent a worsening of macroeconomic conditions by allowing average capital-asset
ratios to fall during recessions. But they do so in a qualified fashion. While being more
permissive in regard to economically stronger banks, they do not allow weaker (poorly
capitalized) banks to participate in credit expansion. Weak banks end up raising their
capital-asset ratios during recessions” (p. 73).

o. The Relationship Between Bank Capital and Bank Loans
Bemanke (1991) examines state level data in order to determine the effect of bank
capital on bank lending, and whether bank capital may play an important role in the credit
crunch phenomenon. A simplified cross-sectional regression of loan growth (annualized
percentage 1990-1991) on bank capital ratios (K/A) produces a positive and statistically
significant correlation for the bank capital variable. The regression model used is:

(A L /L )i9 9 0 -i9 9 i

= -0.182+2.733 (K/A)i989
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KJA is the ratio of bank equity capital to bank assets at the end of 1989. Bemanke
(1991) rationalizes the equation through a model in which banks will adjust lending in
order for their capital-to-asset ratio to meet a target level. The equation on first glance is
consistent with the capital crunch theory in which there is a casual link between low
capital-to-asset ratios and low lending growth in subsequent periods.
Still, there may be an alternative interpretation according to Bemanke (1991). He
explains that if economic conditions are serially correlated, so that poor economic growth
today will lead to poor economic growth tomorrow, then the previously assumed causal
relationship between (K/A) and (AL/L) could actually be spurious. It may be the case that
previous economic “misfortunes” in a state may cause both bank levels of capital and
subsequent economic growth to fall, which would also lead to a slowdown in bank
lending (p. 223). If this is the case, then the relationship between bank capital-to-asset
ratios and lending growth may very well be spuriously correlated, and not casual.
However, Bemanke (1991) explains that “under the alternative interpretation, it is the
recent change in the capital-asset ratio that should be relevant for predicting future
conditions, since if recent times have been difficult the capital-asset ratio will have been
falling, whereas if times have been good the capital-asset ratio will have been rising” (p.
223). Thus, the recent change in capital-to-asset ratio should be included to account for
this factor. The added variable, (K/A)i986-i989, is the change in the ratio of bank equity
capital to bank assets between the end of 1986 and the of 1989. This equation is as
follows:
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(AL/L)i990-1991----0 .199+ 3.005(K /A )i989 —0.846 A(K/A)i986-1989

The result of adding the new variable to the equation is that the level of the
capital-to-asset ratio still produces a positive correlation which is highly statistically
significant. The change in the level of capital-to-asset ratio however produces a negative
sign which is unexpected, but also statistically insignificant. These results further lend
support to the credit crunch hypothesis.
Finally, Bemanke (1991) produces another variation on the first equation which
he feels is more stringent in addressing the potential issue of spurious correlation. State
employment growth (1990-1991), a measure of contemporaneous economic activity, is
added to the right side of the bank lending regression. Adding the employment growth
variable should soak up any predictive power of the (K/A) ratio if there is problem of
spurious correlation, in which the (K/A) ratio is only predictive of future bank loan levels
because it contains information about future economic growth in that state. This equation
is as follows:

(AL/L)i990-i99i — 0.161+2.627 (K/A)i989 +0.755 (AE/E)i99o-i99i

(AE/E) 1990-i 99 i is the annualized percentage employment growth in the state
between 1990:2 - 1991:1. As with the previous regressions, (K/A) remains highly
correlated to (AL/L), even though percentage employment growth also appears to be
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strongly related and significant as well. What this tells us that given current economic
activity, states with lower capital-to-asset ratios still exhibit lower rates of bank lending
growth than those states with higher capital-to-asset ratios. This only further enhances the
credit crunch hypothesis in which the capital-to-asset ratio is an important factor in the
supply of bank loans, as well as providing evidence against the alternative, that the ratios
only show predictive power because it is informative about future economic activity.

p. Triggering a Credit Crunch: 2007-2008
Paul Mizen (2008) takes the view that the U.S. economy was in fact experiencing
a credit crunch in 2007-2008, and that the main trigger for this phenomenon was the
“subprime crisis.” This credit crisis was fueled by conditions in the housing and credit
markets, which have been detailed already. Mizen (2008) explains that credit scores of
subprime borrowers were rising from 1995-2005, the average size of loans were greater
(the largest amount going to those borrowers with the highest credit scores), as well as
loan-to-value ratios increasing. Furthermore there was a problem with the use of brokers
and agents on commission apparently driven by “quantity not quality,” in which there
was much money to be made (assuming mortgages did not default in large number).
Furthermore, there was the issue of “teaser” rates, complex and often confusing
embedded mortgage options, and the use of limiting prepayment options, which supports
the view that many brokers during this period were more interested in sacrificing their
future reputation in exchange for fee income generated by loan arrangement. In its
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extreme cases, there were reports of brokers fraudulently reporting misinformation in
order to ensure successful loan arrangement (p. 539).
Essentially, the high-risk of the subprime mortgages became apparent as default
rates began to mount in 2006. As well, it became evident that pooling these products into
securitized assets did not decrease its risk, as had been advertised. The delinquency rates
on U.S. subprime mortgages have for many years been consistently higher than rates on
prime mortgages. For example, data from the Mortgage Bankers Association
(Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006) show subprime mortgage delinquencies
rates to be 5 Vi times higher than prime mortgage delinquencies rates, and foreclosures 10
times higher in the previous peak in 2001-2002 during the U.S. recession (Mizen, 2008,
p. 539). Mizen (2008) points out that since this figure, delinquency rates have continued
to rise, reaching about 18 percent of all subprime mortgages at the time. The housing
downturn in 2005 created problems for borrowers seeking to refinance their mortgages in
order to avoid higher rates (due to “teaser” rates or other adjustable rate mortgage
structure) as they were unable to do so. As a result of this difficulty to refinance, large
numbers of borrowers were forced into foreclosure, with subprime mortgages accounting
for a large proportion since 2006, and accounting for the majority of all foreclosures in
recent years.
At first glance, it may seem unlikely that subprime mortgages (which have
historically accounted for a small proportion of total U.S. mortgages) should be a main
factor in spawning a credit crunch in the U.S. However, the problem of the increasing
growth of subprime lending was only compounded by the ease at which these loans could
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be originated and the returns received through securitization with minimal apparent risk
to the originators of the loans (Mizen, 2008, p. 540).
Mizen (2008) explains that while there were many issues with the subprime
market during this time, it alone cannot be blamed for the financial collapse and
subsequent credit crunch. His view is that the subprime mortgage markets role was that
of a trigger to the collapse, which in its absence, would have been replaced by any other
high-yielding high-risk asset. This he explains stems from the problem during this period
of mispricing risk, which was widespread, and thus any other high-yielding asset such as
hedge funds, emerging market equity, or private equity, could have been sufficient to
trigger a collapse. Essentially sellers of subprime mortgage securities had underpriced the
risk associated with these complex assets, making the assumption that housing prices
would continue to rise while interest rates remained low. In addition, there appeared to be
a growing uncertainty in assessing the exposure to subprime and other low-quality loans,
due to the complexity of structured products such as securities and derivatives. The result
of this confusion was that banks had to spend much longer evaluating their losses due to
this exposure, as well as increased uncertainty about the losses and exposure of other
banks. This created uncertainty in the interbank market, causing banks to be reluctant to
lend to one another without larger risk premium compensation.
The realization that subprime mortgage securities and other high-yielding assets
carried much higher risk and scale of exposure than anticipated had disastrous effects on
the capital and money markets, which augmented the effects of the credit crunch. The
effect of the subprime mortgage defaults created a much needed reappraisal of not only
mortgage securities hazards, but also the hazards of all types of risky assets. As assets
52

backed by subprime mortgage backed securities were downgraded in June and July 2007
by ratings agencies (from AAA to A+), the capital market became critical of these types
of assets. This created problems for conduits and SIVs, which had funded their purchases
of CDOs and other securitized assets through the issuance of their own asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) at short maturities. Mizen (2008) explains that “ABCP needed
to roll over periodically, usually monthly, but as investors were less willing to purchase
short-term paper in the capital markets, these entities could not obtain the necessary
short-term funding from these markets” (p. 542). After ABCP issuance had peaked in
July 2007, it experienced a very sharp decline in the following months. This decline of
ABCP and the need for rollover funding by SIVs and conduits in the capital market
created pressure on banks’ liquidity. This pressure reduced banks’ incentive to lend on
the interbank market or to invest in short-term paper. The result was that banks began to
hoard liquidity in order to cover future losses transferred to their books from conduits and
SIVs, which were previously not included on their balance sheets. As we know now, the
losses turned out to be substantial, mostly experienced by large investment banks (e.g.
Merrill Lynch, UBS, and Citigroup).
Mizen (2008) explains that this created an environment unfavorable for lending:
“The uncertainty associated with the scale of losses that banks might face created a
dislocation in the interbank markets. Banks would not lend to other banks for fear of
counterparty risk. If borrowing banks had unrevealed losses they might not repay the
funds that they borrowed from other banks“ (pp. 542-543). In addition to the dislocation
of banking in the U.S., there was also the effect of a global freeze in capital and money
markets. However, due to the limitations of this paper, we will not examine the global
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implications, as we intend to primarily focus on the U.S. credit crunch. In addition to the
adverse effects upon the asset-backed securities markets, due to the sudden realization
that these products were much riskier than had previously been considered, the costs of
insurance to cover default risk, such as credit default swaps (CDS), had increased
substantially as well.
Finally, we are able to examine the two main effects of these catastrophic events
in the financial markets. The first effect was that since the capital markets were cut off
from certain types of asset-backed securities, such as subprime mortgage backed
securities and other riskier products, the evaluation of banks to their exposure to these
products (and associated losses) became increasingly difficult. Essentially this meant that
if banks were unable to quantify their losses, as well as the losses of other banks, they
would likely embrace the “precautionary principle,” assume the worst, and take
appropriate actions, in which this case may have been to cut future lending as a way to
shore up their capital positions.
The second implication of these events concerned the increasing LIBOR-OIS
spreads due to the reduction in available funds. This meant that commercial banks with
funding models that relied on short-term commercial paper were now unable to
successfully acquire funds to make loans. The inability to rely on short-term paper also
affected investment banks that relied upon this funding for purchase of asset-backed
securities. The effect was that these banks were then unable to make payments when they
were due.

54

q. Federal Reserve Policy Innovation: Term Lending
Another interesting factor which has affected lending, and thus may be a factor in
creating a credit crunch, is that of market stigma. Due to the financial collapse in the
capital and money markets, most notably subprime mortgage-backed securities, banks
experienced a problem of not having enough liquidity to make loans or cover losses. In
an attempt to increase bank and market liquidity, the Federal Reserve, on August 17,
2007, extended its normal lending period to 30 days and cut the interest rate offered at its
discount window by 50 basis points. Further rate cuts followed with a reduction in the
federal funds target rate by 50 basis points on September 18 and two more cuts of 25
basis points each on October 31 and December 11 (Mizen, 2008, p. 545). While this
issuance of liquidity by the Fed did in fact help make banks more liquid, this liquidity
affected only the overnight markets. There was still a shortage of funds at the 1, 3, and 6
month maturities, which were needed by banks, and meant that the cost of acquiring these
funds increased. Although the Fed had tools at their disposal specifically for this
problem, such as standing facilities to supply liquidity to the markets, they were
essentially made sterile because of the associated market stigma.
The use of these facilities to acquire needed liquidity was also an indicator to the
markets of a bank’s weakness, and this stigma carried with it adverse implications,
making it costlier to raise capital in the equity markets. Because of this stigma,
commercial banks in the United States avoided the discount window and instead
borrowed for one-month terms from the markets, as rates were comparable, but more
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importantly they did not carry the stigma that discount borrowing did. Mizen (2008)
notes that banks further increased their borrowing through the Federal Home Loan Bank,
which provided $200 billion in funds in the 2nd half of 2007 (p. 545).
The problem of market stigma, and its adverse effects on a bank’s ability to raise
funds in the equity markets, greatly reduced the effectiveness of the standing facilities.
Thus, the Fed innovated, realizing that banks were needing lending at the l-,3-, and 6month terms rather than overnight borrowing. This response by the Fed was seen on
December 12, 2007, when it announced a term auction facility (TAF), which would allow
banks to anonymously bid for a predetermined amount of one-month money. These direct
loans from the Fed would ensure an efficient distribution of funds to banks, at a longer
term than the previous overnight facilities, while also addressing the stigma associated
with the discount window.
The aim of the TAF was to reduce the premium in interest rate spreads attributed
to liquidity risk, by making more liquidity available to the financial system at the desired
terms. The distribution of funds was arranged through the auction of fixed amounts, just
as they are sold in open market operations, a feature which the Fed desired to maintain.
Mizen (2008, p. 547) examines some of the new features available through the TAF. The
auctioning of fixed amounts allowed the Federal Reserve to decide how much funds (and
when) would enter the market. As well, the process would be anonymous and
competitive, eliminating the previous stigma attached to borrowing through the standing
facilities. Finally, the auction was broadly based, which allowed the Fed to offer funds to
a larger number of banks. In addition, $20 billion was offered by the Fed in the first TAF
auction, providing liquidity at a 28-day term. Facilities were also created to allow for the
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swapping of dollars for Euros, and vice versa. By July 2008, there had been a total of 16
TAF auctions, for amounts varying from $20 billion to $75 billion.
Furthermore, there were two other additional facilities established in 2008. One
was a primary dealer credit facility designed to improve the ability of primary dealers to
provide funding for non-bank participants in securitization markets, while also promoting
the orderly function of financial markets. The other facility, the Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF), was created for the lending of weekly term securities, used to offer
Treasury securities on a one month loan to investment banks in exchange for eligible
collateral, such as mortgage-backed securities. The use of this facility would allow
dealers to exchange debt that is less liquid for Treasury securities that are more liquid and
tradable. A likely assumption is that these investment banks would in turn lend the
Treasury securities to other firms in exchange for cash, allowing financing of their
balance sheets. In total, Cecchetti (2008) estimates (as of April 2008) that the Federal
Reserve committed nearly $500 billion of liquidity, decomposed as follows: $100 billion
through the TAF, $100 billion in 28-day repurchases of MBSs, $200 billion through the
TSLF, $36 billion in foreign exchange swaps with the European Central Bank, $29
billion to facilitate acquisition by JP Morgan Chase of Bear Steams, and $30 billion to
the primary dealer credit facility (Mizen 2008, p. 547). In conclusion concerning these
new tools used by the Federal Reserve, it is clear that these innovations were aimed at
improving liquidity within the banking and financial system, allowing banks to be able to
acquire needed funds more efficiently. The route through improving liquidity however is
not one of direct loans of cash or deposits, but rather through the exchange of eligible
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collateral (even MBSs, which had become increasingly difficult to sell) for more liquid
Treasuries, which could be easily exchanged for cash in their respective markets.

r. Financial System Assistance: Limiting the Damage of a Credit Crunch
Another attempt to limit the damage of credit crunch in the financial system was
through the Feds role in rescuing private investment banks, by way of extended loans or
playing an active role in the arrangement of bank acquisition. For example, Bear Steams,
a private investment bank heavily invested in structured finance products, soon faced
market scrutiny as the markets became concerned about the degree of leverage and the
quality of the MBSs which they had invested. Mizen (2008) points to a report in which
Goldman Sachs allegedly notified hedge fund Hayman Capital that it would no longer
expose itself to counterparty risk with Bear Stearns, as they had previously claimed they
would (p. 549). This report spread throughout Wall Street, spurring an investment bank
run, limiting Bear Steams ability to finance its activities and liabilities. It became evident
that Bear Steams would no longer be able to roll over their short-term ABCP assets,
which they had used to finance their activity, and would not be able to meet their
payments. Because of the exposure risk of many other large financial institutions, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York intervened, arranging for a 28-day loan via JP
Morgan Chase. Furthermore, as analysis showed that a takeover would be necessary, the
Federal Reserve became even further involved. The takeover of Bear Steams was
arranged through the Federal Reserve, in which the price of shares was increased from $2
to $10 in order to appease shareholders, with a $29 billion loan coming from the Federal
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Reserve, and JP Morgan Chase taking on the first $1 billion of losses to Bear Steams
(Mizen, 2008, p. 549.)

s. The Involvement of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
Just like Bear Stearns, but with differing circumstances, mortgage giants Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae found themselves in need of support. Support was offered directly
from the U.S. Treasury after receiving advice from the Federal Reserve, as well as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in July 2008. Due to the fragile asset
markets, more specifically those involving subprime mortgage backed assets, these two
institutions faced an inability to raise new capital. Both institutions held a large amount
of MBSs due to their own issuance or through market purchases as a means to make
loans more affordable, a mandate of the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) through the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both had moderate holdings of subprime mortgages, which
exposed them to greater risk, as these assets were greatly affected by the downturn in the
housing markets that lead to falling housing prices and increased delinquencies on their
own issued mortgages, as well as those which they had insured. Falling stock prices of
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the end of 2007 to mid 2008 were a sign of fears
in the markets concerning these institutions future profitability, as well as circulated
suspicion by Lehman Brothers that between them they would require $75 billion in
additional funding, which may require the diluting of ownership. While this scale may
seem small and insignificant for an institution of its size, there was great concern about
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the level of maintained capital, as both institutions typically maintained only a small
percentage of capital compared to other mortgage institution. This was due to the implicit
belief that their debt was guaranteed by the government, which allowed them to borrow
cheaply, requiring less capital to insure their borrowing. Due to the fact that many banks,
pension funds, and money markets hold Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt securities and
use them as collateral for borrowing, a decline in the value of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac issued debt securities was a primary concern. As a result, U.S. Treasury Secretary
Hank Paulson responded (July 14, 2008) with a proposal of a $300 billion credit line. In
addition, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 approved a plan which
allowed the U.S. Treasury, up until December 31,2009, to purchase debt securities and
shares in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

t. Provision of Information and its Regulation: The Root of the 2007-2008
Credit Crunch
The apparent Credit Crunch of 2007-2008, according to Mizen (2008), stems
from “the information gap” (Giovannini and Spaventa, 2008) between loan originator and
end investor. This information gap involves the provision of information, the regulations
which pertain to this information, and the complexities in the assessment of risk. Mizen
(2008) explains that there had been a change in banking practices, in which banks
adopted originate and distribute models. This shift to originate and distribute models had
altered the incentives faced by the loan originators, as well as information concerning the
risks of the loans, a fact to which both investors and regulators were oblivious.
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Again, much of the distortion of risk stems from securitization of loans, as well as
the inherent alteration of incentives. For example, it is likely that a lender, who intends to
securitize loans, will have less incentive to scrutinize the quality of the borrower, as well
as the collateral against the loan. Furthermore, there is an information asymmetry
between the seller of the security and the buyer, a problem Mizen (2008, p. 552) finds to
be difficult to overcome, even by ratings agencies. This problem of the provision of
information may come from information not being collected all together, or if it is
collected, it may not be transferred from the asset originator to the asset buyer, a failure
of the provision of information. Mizen (2008) explains that this differs from a standard
information asymmetry model where true information cannot be acquired (and must be
taken on a trust basis), or, if the information can be collected, it would require a
monitoring cost. The information asymmetry which Mizen (2008) examines involves
information that is readily available and without monitoring costs, but the information
does not become revealed only because the investor does not require it to be revealed by
the asset seller. Thus, there were many cases in which the information concerning the
viability of borrowers to repay back the loans, or the collateral which was held against the
loans, was not passed up the chain, not because it wasn’t available, but simply because it
was not requested. The information that was provided was minimal, only enough for the
sellers to satisfy the information demands of the investors at the next link in the chain of
sales. Since “information gaps” existed at all gaps between seller and buyer, it is likely
that there may have been a continual reduction of important information being
transmitted the further downstream the asset was sold, much in the way information is
distorted in a children’s “telephone game.”
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Furthermore, while there was an “information gap” (and uncertainty of risk) due
to a lack of interest on the part of the buyer, it did not dissuade investors, thanks to an
overbearing trust in ratings agencies. Mizen (2008, p. 553) points to a U.S. President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets reports (2008) which notes that “investors relied
excessively on credit ratings, which contributed to their complacency about the risks they
were assuming in pursuit of higher returns. Although market participants had economic
incentives to conduct due diligence and evaluate risk-adjusted returns, the steps they took
were insufficient, resulting in significant erosion of market discipline.” Again, a main
factor in the apparent 2007-2008 credit crunch seems to be an underestimation and
overall misunderstanding of the inherent risks in the securities markets, whether due to
complexities in the model itself, or from simple complacency due to the incentive
structure within the involved institutions.
While there is also an issue of the complexity in the assessment of risk, the scope
of this paper is too narrow to examine this issue as thoroughly as we would like. Thus,
we will simply point to the assessment that these ratings, which were unreliable as a
barometer of the inherent risk associated with financial assets, were nonetheless relied
upon by investors. Therefore the systematically underestimated risk was not
acknowledged due to the reliance upon asset ratings, allowing for a remarkable
complacency in market discipline which led investors to stray away from undertaking a
proper assessment and monitoring of risks.
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u. Federal Reserve Policy Changes: Empirical Evidence of Policy Induced
Credit Crunch
As has already been conveyed, a key element of the credit crunch hypothesis
revolves around factors which produce a reduction in the supply of bank credit. One
potential contributor to a leftward shift in the supply of bank credit may come from
changes in government policy, more specifically changes in monetary policy. However, it
may become a challenge to monitor Federal Reserve policy change and subsequent
changes in the supply of credit, as we are not always privy to a transparent Federal
Reserve. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a proxy for Federal Reserve policy. One
such proxy is the Federal Funds Rate (FFR), which Ben Bemanke (1992) argues is a
superior indicator of monetary policy actions; it sensitively records shocks to the supply
of bank reserves, and therefore is extremely informative about future movements of
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, Bemanke (1992) shows that this is consistent
with the view that monetary policy works in part through credit as well as through
money, an essential piece to the credit crunch hypothesis.
One of the basic assumptions and conclusions which Bemanke (1992) reaches is
that monetary policy is effective upon the real economy, a crucial aspect of the regulatory
induced credit crunch hypothesis. The empirical evidence shows that a variety of
measures of real activity responds to shocks to the Federal Funds rate (p. 903). As well,
he finds that monetary transmission works through bank loans as well as through
deposits. However, loans do appear to be sluggish to changes in monetary policy, which
Bemanke (1992) explains makes sense because loans are contractual obligations. This
also explains why he finds loans to be bad indicators for economic forecasting. However,
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he notes that loans do eventually respond substantially to change in the Federal Funds
rate, coinciding closely to the response of the unemployment rate (p. 903). While
Bemanke (1992) does not feel that this coincidence proves that loans carry the impact of
monetary policy to the real economy, it does at least appear to be consistent with credit
crunch hypothesis.
Through the use of Granger-causality tests, Bemanke (1992) establishes that the
Federal Funds rate is the most robust predictor of real economic activity (when compared
against M l, M2, Treasury Bill rate, and Treasury Bond rate). The results are also similar,
although slightly less robust when using a different measure of predictive power
constructed from a VAR with orthogonalized residuals (the percentage of the variance of
the forecasted variable as attributable to alternative right-hand-side variables at different
horizons). The essential importance of these findings is that macroeconomists should turn
their focus to shocks stemming from the market for bank reserves. As well, it shows that
the real effects of monetary policy may be transmitted directly through interest rates,
rather than simply through changes in bankable reserves (p. 908).
Furthermore, there is the effect which monetary policy (as observed by changes in
the Federal Funds rate) has on the organization of bank assets in the short-run, as well as
the supply of loans should tight money become persistent and occur for a longer period of
time. Bemanke (1992) explains how tight money (what he calls a positive innovation in
the Federal Funds rate), although with some lag, will produce a reduction in the supply of
credit, as tight money reduces the volume of deposits held by depository institutions. He
explains that “naturally, bank assets fall along with bank liabilities; but the composition
of the fall is noteworthy. For the first six months or so after the policy shock, the fall in
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assets is concentrated almost entirely in securities; loans hardly move. However, shortly
thereafter, security holdings begin gradually to be rebuilt, while loans start to fall. By the
time two years has elapsed, security holdings have almost returned to their original value,
and essentially the entire decline in deposits is reflected in loans” (p.919). Thus, should
this reduction in the quantity of loans demanded be primarily due to a leftwards shift in
the supply of credit; we would then conclude that monetary policy has produced a true
credit crunch.
This shift appears to produce real economic effects, falling in line with the
timeline of the reduction of loans. The effects to unemployment are essentially non
existent during the first two or three quarters after a shock to the funds rate, but at about
nine-months, about the exact same time as we see the adverse effect to the supply of
loans, unemployment begins to rise gradually. This growth in unemployment persists for
about 2 years before declining back towards zero.
Finally, there is still one crucial question which needs to be addressed in order to
claim support for the credit crunch hypothesis. Should these effects be associated with a
fall in credit demand, we cannot claim that a reduction in credit is policy induced, or
below the desirable quantity. Instead, a decline in credit due to falling credit demand
would be much more aligned with a liquidity trap view, in which monetary policy would
become sterile regardless, leaving market clearing credit levels unfazed. Bernanke (1992)
however does not see this as a plausible explanation due to two main reasons. One reason
is that there should be no incentive for bank portfolios to systematically be related to the
stance of monetary policy or the level of real economic activity if loans are perfect
substitutes with government securities and corporate bonds. Bernanke (1992) shows that
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this is not the case, as banks appear to reorganize their portfolios systematically following
monetary policy innovations. Secondly, support for a dominant supply effect comes with
the examination of the composition of firms’ borrowing. Firm borrowing appears to also
be sensitive to monetary policy, with loans falling and alternative means of finance (such
as commercial paper) rising during periods of tight money. Bemanke (1992) explains that
“if the decline in bank loans following a monetary tightening were simply a passive
response to falling credit demand, we would expect all forms of corporate borrowing to
decline” (p. 919).
In addition and ultimately related to Bemanke’s (1992) discussion of the
importance and effects of changes in the Federal Funds rate, Bolton and Freixas (2006)
summarize their findings on corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. They summarize that “a monetary tightening not only brings about
the expected increase in the cost of borrowing, but as it induces a decrease in bank
spreads, it also reduces banks’ incentives to increase the equity-capital base. Capitaladequacy regulations thus may induce a decrease in the supply of loans through a
contraction of the equity-capital base and thus magnify the contractionary effect of
monetary policy” (p. 857).

v. The Reduction in Bank Lending: Survey Evidence from 2010
While it is useful to examine underlying data, theoretical frameworks, and
execute multiple regression analysis to try and find the answers to whether the U.S.
economy has recently experienced (or is experiencing) a credit crunch, as well as the
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factors which affect this phenomenon, it is equally useful to turn towards anecdotal
evidence via survey in order to gain a more direct answer. Jeon et al. (2010) summarize
the findings of the 2010 Survey of Community Banks conducted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston. The survey aims to gain greater understanding of the change in both
supply and demand of bank business loans following the financial crisis of 2008.
The survey employs a variety of both qualitative and quantitative questions. The
survey provides evidence that while there was a greater reduction in bank business loans,
the greatest reduction was faced by new customers. This can be explained, and should be
expected, as banks face the problem of asymmetric information. This is less problematic
between bank and existing customer, as their existing relationship has provided a channel
for both parties to adapt and understand the position of the other over time. However, the
survey finds that this penalty towards new customers has become even more severe since
the financial crisis. One possible explanation is that banks may view new customers as
even more of a risk (real or perceived due to asymmetric information) in light of the
financial crisis. Jeon et al. (2010) explain that “from a community bank’s perspective, it
is difficult to ascertain whether a business line of credit was not renewed by another bank
because that bank developed balance sheet problems, or if instead the other bank had
private information indicating that the business was a poor risk” (pg. 6). This is perfectly
rational with the correlation between increased risk and reduced lending, which is
expected.
Another important aspect to this survey is that smaller community banks were less
exposed to balance sheet problems that the large commercial banks face as a result of the
subprime mortgage crisis. The survey reveals that community banks generally did not
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report that balance sheet problems impeded their ability to lend. Large commercial banks
however suffered greater losses during the financial crisis due to their increased exposure
to subprime-based assets, and were subsequently forced to restrict lending, likely due to a
reduction in capital as well as increased risk weighted asset level associated with Capital
Adequacy Restrictions. The survey also concludes that community banks seem unable to
accommodate the excess demand for loans, as businesses seeking loans from large banks
are denied (due to either balance sheet problems, increased credit standards, or reduced
credit worthiness).

V.

Summary and Conclusions
(1). In conclusion, we hope to bring together the multifaceted aspects of the Great

Recession of 2007-2009, which has often been cited as an example of the Credit Crunch
phenomenon. In its most basic form, the Credit Crunch phenomenon has been cited as a
condition of a leftward shift in the supply of bank loans. However, a more specific
definition of what we consider a true Credit Crunch falls more in line with that of Clair
and Tucker (1993), in which they document that the term has been used in the past to
"explain curtailment of the credit supply in response to both (i) a decline in the value of
bank capital and (ii) conditions imposed by regulators, bank supervisors, or banks
themselves that require banks to hold more capital than they previously would have held"
(Mizen, 2008, p. 531). Furthermore, there is little debate on the essential cause of the
Great Recession and ensuing Credit Crunch. The main trigger mechanism for the severe
economic downturn was seeded in the financial sector, specifically in the subprime
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mortgage backed securities market, which has also led this episode to be referred to as the
“subprime crisis” (Mizen, 2008, p. 539).
As has been the typical trend for recessions produced by a financial crisis, this
particular recession was preceded by a period of impressive economic growth. As returns
on subprime mortgage products such as mortgage backed securities began to increase, so
did their popularity in financial markets. Along with this popularity due to increased
returns, was also the overlooked risk of these products. Aside from the increasing
popularity of products due to increasing profit returns, they became popular as well due
to the ease at which these loans could be originated and the returns received through
securitization (with minimal apparent risk to originators of the loans) (Mizen, 2008, p.
540). Subprime mortgages and related products carried with them a high risk, which was
only apparent as default rates began to accumulate in 2006. Investors and financial
institutions also overlooked the inherent risk of these products due to the assumption that
pooling these products together decreased the effective risk, an assumption that has since
been painfully shown as flawed logic. The fallout of the crashing subprime mortgage
market produced collateral damage in other financial markets as investors had to reassess
whether the associated risks had also been miscalculated. Essentially the financial
markets became gridlocked with fear of lending due to the uncertainty of subprime
mortgage market exposure. This uncertainty of subprime mortgage market exposure was
attributed to the confusing and complex nature of derivative products such as credit
default swaps, confusion concerning who was the proper owner of the mortgages, and
confusion concerning the rate and magnitude of losses due to future non-performing
loans. These combined effects led to a reluctance of banks to lend to one another without
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larger risk premium compensation (Mizen, 2008, p. 541). Essentially, banks would not
lend to one another due to “counter-party risk.” Another intrinsic problem with the
crashing of the subprime mortgage market was that the true value of the subprime
mortgages and their related products could not be accurately assessed, as the prices most
likely exhibited an undervalued price due to the newfound risk adverse sentiment of the
market, a complete 180 degree change from the sentiment prior to the mounting default
rates of subprime mortgages. Therefore, banks with exposure to these markets were
unable to accurately value their assets and losses, potentially showing artificially smaller
asset levels and losses. As asset levels are assumed to be important to bank lending due to
the Basel Accords and risk-based capital requirements, it is possible that this in itself
could lead to lower levels of bank credit, and symptoms of a credit crunch, than would
otherwise be the case.
(2). Another aspect which we feel may have led to a slowdown in lending during
and following the Great Recession of 2007-2009 is that of market stigma, which
essentially created a disincentive for banks to visit the discount window to recapitalize.
While Federal Reserve injections of liquidity undoubtedly affected overnight lending
rates, there was still a shortage of much needed funds at longer maturities. Although the
Federal Reserve had standing facilities specifically for this need, it has been argued that
due to market stigma attached to borrowing from the Fed, these facilities had become
sterile. This market stigma follows that a bank which uses these facilities to acquire
needed liquidity must therefore be a weak and undercapitalized bank, a key indicator to
the market of a bank’s weakness and lack of solvency.
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common problem in bank lending, this however was not the typical case of
undiscoverable information; it was an information gap associated with the lack of interest
in loan details and borrower information. As loans were destined to be securitized and
sold downstream, little information was either required or sought after by originators and
investors. Furthermore, the information gap was due to the reliance upon credit ratings.
Mizen (2008) explains that “investors relied excessively on credit ratings, which
contributed to their complacency about the risks they were assuming in pursuit of higher
returns. Although market participants had economic incentives to conduct due diligence
and evaluate risk-adjusted returns, the steps they took were insufficient, resulting in
significant erosion of market discipline” (p. 553). Once again we find that the
misunderstanding and underestimation of risk associated with financial products were
crucial to the eventual financial market collapse, and likely created a credit crunch
situation during and following the Great Recession of 2007-2009. While banks,
borrowers, investors, and regulators had underestimated risk prior to the financial
collapse, it is also likely that they may have overestimated risk following the collapse, or
should it be the case that parties merely reconfigured their risk analysis to more
accurately assess risk, a credit crunch situation would still likely ensue.
(4). Another key aspect is that we find that recession tends to lead to the
tightening of credit standards, especially when spurred by a financial collapse, as was the
case with the Great Recession. Bemanke (1991) notes that while overall lending may
decline due to increased credit standards and decreased credit worthiness of borrowers
following a financial collapse, it may also be the case that credit is created at a lower
nominal cost. While banks tighten credit standards, they also take the position of lending
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Thus, stigma may make it more difficult for banks to further recapitalize through
equity markets. As one-month rates from the markets were comparable to the discount
window rates, and did not carry with it the same stigma, banks relied upon the markets
for longer term maturities. The need for longer maturities was observed by the Federal
Reserve, and the Fed adapted when they announced a term auction facility (TAF) which
would allow banks to anonymously bid on a predetermined amount of one-month
funding. We feel that this Fed innovation was an important response to the needs of the
market, allowing for increased capitalization while eliminating the adverse effects of
market stigma. The result of this innovation was to not only eliminate the attached market
stigma, but to also reduce the premium in interest rates spreads attributed to liquidity risk.
So while there are arguments that central banks may play an important role in
propagating a credit crunch, it is often overlooked those innovations and responses in
which central banks and regulations contribute to the easing of a credit crunch, making
markets more liquid.
(3). Another key contributor to the financial collapse and economic slowdown, as
pointed out by Mizen (2008), is that of “the information gap” between loan originator and
investor. As banks shifted lending models towards originate and distribute models,
incentives faced by loan originators were thus altered, as well as the information
concerning the risk of these loans. Investors, regulators, and possibly originators alike
were oblivious to this fact. The changes in origination incentives and the distortion of risk
is highly correlated with the increased popularity of loan securitization associated with
these new originate and distribute models, as well as increased returns, ease of originate,
and other aspects which have already been detailed. While asymmetric information is a
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to safer investments at lower interest rates, essentially rationing credit. Thus, while the
overall level of lending may take a leftward shift, the cost of borrowing may actually
decline overall. This falls in line with our previous observations of prime loan rates
already detailed, in which rates were observed to decline during and following the Great
Recession. Furthermore, we do not find this is evidence against the credit crunch
phenomenon; we simply view this as banks rationing credit due to a new found risk
adverse position, reduced liquidity positions, or regulatory pressure to avoid lending to
certain borrowers.
Credit rationing, we find, is a key feature and potentially adverse effect of the
credit crunch phenomenon. This rationing becomes inequitably if it predominantly affects
bank dependent borrowers, such as small businesses. The problem of inequity in bank
lending comes from the finding that small business, typically bank dependent borrowers,
generally makes up a large proportion of new customers. Assuming that small business
plays a large role in technological innovation, a key to long-term economic growth, a
credit crunch which leads to inequitable rationing (and pushes out new customers such as
small businesses), may have widespread adverse real economic effects. We tend to agree
with Bemanke (1991), who argues that reduced bank lending arising from a capital
shortage “could dampen economic activity, affecting aggregate demand and aggregate
supply,” in which the aggregate supply effects are straight-forward: “by limiting access to
working capital, reduced lending could force firms to shed workers and delay investment
plains, reducing output in both the short and long run” (p.229). The demand effects of a
credit crunch are equally as straight-forward. Due to limited liquidity in the banking
sector, previously bank dependent borrowers who are squeezed out of the market would
73

be forced to seek more costly forms of funding, such as by issuing commercial paper.
This would lead to reduced expected net profit, and thus a downward shift in the IS
curve, leading to reduced aggregate output.
(5). In addition, Hubbard (1995) has proposed that an adverse shock to a
borrower’s net worth will increase external finance costs while decreasing the borrower’s
ability to implement investment, employment, and production plans. These effects
provide what is described as a “financial accelerator,” magnifying an initial small shock
to net worth. This has addressed a certain macroeconomic concern previously associated
with the “money view,” and helps to explain how monetary policy actions that have not
generally led to changes in real interest rates, may result in cyclical movements in
aggregate demand, particularly that of business fixed investment and inventory
investment. Thus, we see an overall shift in funding costs. The spread between external
and internal finance varies inversely with the borrower’s net worth, internal funds, and
collateralizable resources, relative to the amount of funds required. This reasoning helps
to further support the view that credit crunches may produce features of inequitable
funding costs, based upon whether borrowers are bank dependent.
(6). Furthermore, we find that what is typically referred to as a “credit crunch,” is
often more accurately described as a “capital crunch” (Watanabe 2007). This
phenomenon, for example, stems from the observed simultaneous large drop in bank
lending and bank capital, as was the case during the 1990 recession. A central focus of
our paper has shown concern for a particular “credit crunch,” a regulatory driven “credit
crunch.” Watanabe (2007) explains that “regulatory driven capital crunch hypothesis
usually centers on the internationally recognized bank capital regulation know as the risk74

based (adjusted) capital (RBC) standard, a key element of the banking regulatory
framework” (p. 642). Specifically, these risk-based capital standards referenced are those
following the Basel I and Basel II Accords. The effectiveness of these regulations is a key
assumption to show that under-capitalized banks who fail to meet regulatory capital-toasset ratios face hard times in raising capital to meet minimum requirements specified by
Basel I and Basel II. Following increased difficulty in meeting these requirements, as is
the case during recession, banks would likely shift to modifying their asset holdings by
cutting lending, while increasing holdings of government bonds in order to adjust their
overall risk, as government bonds carry a risk-weight of 0%.
(7). We have found that risk-based capital standards have also contributed to the
propagation of the trend of securitization, particularly that of subprime mortgage
securitization and its related financial products, such as credit default swaps. We have
shown that through securitization, and also with the purchase of a credit default swap
(CDS) from an AAA rated insurer, the derivative product itself would inherit an AAA
rating, effectively reducing the risk-weight for the security. Therefore, banks had
incentives to originate loans for securitization and take part in the derivatives markets by
purchasing credit default swaps for these loans if only for the incentive of reducing their
overall capital requirements through the reduction of risk-weights associated with
attaining an AAA rating for their products. This would allow a bank to invest beyond
their typical means by purchasing the CDS from an AAA insurer. JP Morgan Chase is
one bank who took advantage of this process, as they felt the 8% capital requirement
established by Basel I was unreasonable, and were able to implement credit default swaps
to effectively reduce their capital requirement to a mere 1.6% of assets. Finally, there is a
75

problem when it comes to examining overall levels of lending, which concerns mortgage
securitization. As it turns out, mortgages originated for securitization are typically not
kept on bank accounts, and therefore do not show up when examining loan levels.
Therefore, should securitization take up an increasing proportion of overall bank loans, it
may produce what looks to be a decrease in loan levels, a credit crunch, but this may
simply be a mirage. Furthermore, it is possible that it may also be the case that the
economy is experiencing a credit crunch, but due to a decrease in loan securitization, it
may not appear so. For example: if loan securitization took up a larger proportion of
overall loans prior to the recession, those loans would not have shown up on overall
lending figures. Should there be a shift to reduce loan securitization, these previously
unobservable figures would now show up on loan figures, making it appear that lending
has either maintained its previous level, or even increased, although it may be the case
that lending overall has declined. Due to the brevity of this paper, we cannot fully
examine this issue, but it is our feeling that this may play an important part in examining
overall lending trends. A quick examination of bank loan levels does not show a
significant slowdown in bank lending, but we suspect that this may be due to a slowdown
in the securitization trends.
(8). As capital-to-asset ratios have played a key role in our examination of credit
crunches and the Great Recession in particular, we have looked at how bank regulators
enforce capital-to-asset ratios during economic expansion and contraction. We find that
bank regulators are typically more lenient during economic contraction, while being
stricter during economic expansion. Thus, capital-to-asset levels tend to grow during
economic expansion, while typically falling during recession. However, we find that bank
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regulators do not allow weaker banks (as measured by K/A ratios) to participate in the
expansion during economic recession. Thus, weak banks tend to build capital levels
during recession, as they are not permitted to lend at the levels of the stronger capital
sufficient banks.
(9). One difficulty in examining the credit crunch phenomenon is that of
separating the effects of supply and demand in bank lending. As we have stated earlier, it
is important to rule that a reduction in lending stems from the supply side, rather than the
demand side, in order to confirm a credit crunch. Bemanke (1991) gives us an example in
which he examined the 1990 recession. He states that should a credit crunch take place,
we would likely see a substitution effect take place, in which previous bank dependent
borrowers facing higher rates or insufficient funds would switch to alternative forms of
finance. The result should be a reduction in bank loans and a simultaneous increase in
alternate forms of finance, such as non-financial commercial paper. This appears to be a
trend in recessions prior to the 1990 recession, in which Bemanke (1991) finds as
evidence of prior credit crunches. However, he finds a simultaneous decline in bank loans
and non-financial commercial paper, which he argues is evidence that demand factors
played a key role in that recession. This of course, takes the position that bank loans and
bonds are highly substitutable. It may also be the case that banks are unwilling to make
loans, and investors are unwilling to purchase corporate bonds as well. Due to the
magnitude and nature of the recent financial collapse and ensuing recession, we feel that
this argument would be overly simplistic to argue for or against a credit crunch. The
reduced investor confidence most likely would take effect upon bank loans as well as
non-financial commercial paper.
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(10). Finally, and what we feel is one of the most important questions raise in our
research, is the question of: “should a credit crunch be found to occur, should the credit
crunch be remedied?” On the surface, the question may produce a knee-jerk “yes!”
response. However, we find that the question is much more complex when one examines
the problems associated with under-estimated risks and misplaced incentives which had
produced the financial collapse, Great Recession, and ensuing credit crunch. While a
credit crunch often carries with it different interpretations and understandings, in its
simplest form it is a reduction in bank lending. But what has brought about this reduced
lending? If the reduction in lending comes from a new found understanding and
realization of the true risk involved in certain assets, such as subprime mortgages and
securities, resulting in a reduction in these inefficient and costly investments, is this a
necessary evil? A credit crunch may merely be a reassessment of risk, resulting in a more
“fair” assessment of this risk and lending practices. We have found that bank regulators
typically are no better at assessing risk than banks during credit booms.
Another side to the story may be that during credit expansion, the undervaluing of
risk may be what would be considered a “credit bubble,” an oversupply of credit beyond
what is efficient. These are all important and complex questions for which we do not
have a definite answer. Thus, bank regulators are put in a unique position. Bank
regulators face an important trade-off. The trade-off is that they must decide to enforce
capital-to-asset requirements during recession, with the potential to create a credit crunch
and infringe upon economic recovery and expansion, while increasing bank solvency, or
decide to be lenient in the enforcement of capital-to-asset requirements, while allowing
for increased economic recovery and expansion, but also sacrificing bank solvency.
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There is no simply solution, but we feel that bank regulators must examine the whole
picture and not simply make a decision for tight or easy money when faced with
recession. Furthermore, we feel that steps should be taken to reduce market frictions and
help to buffer economic downturns. In particular, by re-examining the risk-based capital
requirements, which we find have the potential to become binding when banks are at
their weakest during recession.
Finally, we realize that a central bank cannot force banks to lend; they can only
help to make monetary channels more liquid. However, we find that through the riskbased capital requirements system currently in place, they do however have the ability to
alter incentives in order to incentivize lending. As it stands, banks have an incentive to
invest in government securities due to their 0% risk-weight. We feel that this should be
examined, and recommend that the risk-weight should be increased in order to encourage
investment elsewhere, especially during recession. Aside from altering incentives, we
find this risk-weight is simply not logical, especially at a time in which the U.S.
government is struggling to handle their own finances. It is looking more and more likely
that the U.S. will be forced to default on some of their outstanding debt obligations,
whether in the short-term or long-term, due to the inability to agree upon a meaningful
debt plan with substance.
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